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INTRODUCTION

Advertising is an ancient practice, at least two thousand
years old.' But comparative advertising is a truly modem phenomenon, just twenty years old.2 It is also a uniquely American activity. While comparative advertising is disdained in most other
4
countries, 3 it is commonplace here.
I Advertising in the modem sense dates from Rome and Pompeii:

It is in the records of Rome ... and Pompeii that we first find advertising which comes within the modern meaning of the term. This advertising consisted of persuasive announcements painted on walls in
black or red. Examples of it uncovered .

.

. in the ruins of Pompeii

indicate that the commercial world was beginning to develop advertising sense two thousand years ago, and that written advertising came
soon after the spread of literacy in ancient Rome, only to disappear
with the decline in ability to read that followed and lasted through
centuries of the Dark Ages.
FRANK PRESBREY, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF ADVERTISING 6-7 (1968) (em-

phasis in original).
2 In the early 1970s, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) encouraged the television networks to broadcast comparative advertisements. Before the FTC acted,
advertisers shunned comparative advertising as "unethical." See, e.g., Comparative
Advertising is not for the Faint of Heart, 24 EXECUTIVE, Dec. 1982, at 49, 49 (until the
FTC acted, comparative advertising was "frowned on by professional codes, media
guidelines, and government restrictions"); Robert Posch, Jr., ComparativeAdvertising
Yesterday and Today, DIRECT MARKETING, May 1982, at 106, 106 (Until the last 10

years, "self-imposed media and professional regulations discouraged comparative
advertising"); Stephen W. Brown & Donald W. Jackson, Jr., The Current Status of
Comparative Advertising, ARIZ. Bus., Feb. 1979, at 3, 3-4 ("[T]he practice of using
comparative [advertising] is relatively new." Prior to the 1970s, advertisers stayed
away from comparative advertising "due to an unwritten code of honor within the
advertising industry."); Thomas E. Barry & Roger L. Tremblay, ComparativeAdvertising. PerspectivesAnd Issues, 4:4J. OF ADVERTISING 15, 16 (1975) (Until the FTC acted,
comparative advertising represented a technique avoided for many years).
3 Comparative advertising remains illegal in many countries. SeeJ.J. Boddewyn,
The One and Many Worlds of Advertising: Regulatory Obstacles and Opportunities, 7:1 INT'L
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Comparative advertising has proven to be a powerful technique. 5 Practically overnight, it can transform an obscure product into a market leader.6 Thus, advertisers 'have recently
employed powerful comparative advertising campaigns to promote all types of goods and services, from sophisticated personal
computers 7 to simple hamburgers. 8 Even hospitals 9 and state
J.

OF ADVERTISING 11 (1988).

In general, common law countries tend to tolerate

comparative advertising except in "extreme cases of bad faith," whereas "civil law
nations do not tolerate" comparative advertising. See J.J. Boddewyn, Nations Apply
Different Laws to Comparison Ads, MARKETING NEWS, Oct. 6, 1978, at 3, 3.
4 See, e.g., Comparative Advertising: Red in Tooth and Claw, THE ECONOMIST, May
18, 1991, at 79, 79 (comparative advertising "grows ever more popular - and
pointed - in America"); Darrel D. Muehling & Norman Kangun, The Multi-Dimensionality of Comparative Advertising: Implicationsfor the Federal Trade Commission, J. OF
PUB. POL'Y AND MARKETING 112, 112 (1985) ("Comparative advertising is becoming
more common and is increasingly being used by companies in diverse industries.");
Patricia Winters & Wayne Wally, Coke Seeks Tough TV Ad Watchdog, ADVERTISING
AGE, Oct. 8, 1990, at 1, 1 (noting a "dramatic rise" in the use of comparative advertising); Meryl Freeman, Comparative Cautions, MARKETING AND MEDIA DECISIONS,
Sept. 1987, at 82, 82 ("Over one-third of today's advertising is comparative.").
5 See, e.g., William L. Wilkie & Paul W. Farris, Comparison Advertising: Problems
and Potential,J. OF MARKETING, Oct. 1975, at 7, 15 (comparative advertising represents "a powerful tool for the marketer"); Darrel D. Muehling et al., The Impact of
Comparative Advertising on Levels of Message Involvement, 19:4 J. OF ADVERTISING 41
(1990) (finding that consumers pay greater attention to comparative advertising
and hence it is more effective); Ronald L. Earl & William M. Pride, Do Disclosure
Attempts Influence Claim Believability and PerceivedAdvertiser Credibility?, 12:1 J. OF THE
ACAD. OF MARKETING Sci. 23, 24 (1984) (comparative advertising may increase consumer confidence in product claims); Aimee L. Morner, It Pays to Knock Your Competitor, FORTUNE, Feb. 13, 1978, at 104, 105 ("Comparative advertising was slow to
catch on ....

[b]ut it sells the goods"); Cornelia Pechmann & David W. Stewart,

The Effects of ComparativeAdvertising on Attention, Memory, and PurchaseIntentions, 17:2 J.
OF CONSUMER RES., Sept. 1990, at 180, 188 (comparative advertising can increase
purchase intentions for low-marketshare brands); Some ComparativeAds Work, O&M
Concedes, ADVERTISING AGE, Nov. 3, 1980, at 6, 6 (comparative advertising can be a
potent "short-term tactical weapon"); Herschell G. Lewis, The Art of Comparative
Copy, CATALOG AGE, Apr. 1990, at 103, 103 (comparative advertising is one of the
strongest devices); Darrel D. Muehling, et al., ComparativeAdvertising: Views from Advertisers, Agencies, Media, and Policy Makers, 29:5 J. OF ADVERTISING RES., Oct./Nov.
1989, at 38, 47 (comparative advertising constitutes "a very persuasive technique");
M. Carole Macklin & Crofford J. Macklin, Jr., Refuting a Competitor's Advertising Claim,
8 J. OF BUS. STRATEGY, Summer 1987, at 71, 71 (comparative advertisements become lethal weapons when used by competitors); Cornelia Droge & Rene Y.
Darmon, Associative PositioningStrategies Through ComparativeAdvertising: Attribute Versus
Overall Similarity Approaches, 24J. OF MARKETING RES., Nov. 1987, at 377, 385 (comparative advertising shown empirically to promote better overall brand positioning); Z.S. Demirdjian, Sales Effectiveness of ComparativeAdvertising: An Experimental Field
Investigation, 10:3 J. OF CONSUMER RES. 362, 362 (1983) (comparative advertising,
with objective information concerning the products, "outweighs its noncomparative counterpart in sales effectiveness").
6 Leslie Wines, Name Calling, MADISON AVENUE, Apr. 1985, at 54, 54.
7 See Chris Lewis, The Young Man and the PC, DIRECTOR, Apr. 1991, at 63, 64
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governments' ° have resorted to it.
While comparative advertising may take many forms," one
type stands out as the most effective. This type of advertising not
only claims that a product is better than competing products, but
cites a scientific study or test to "establish" the claim. Advertisers have found that "scientific establishment claims" - claims of
scientifically-proven superiority - are quite effective. 2 This is
not surprising in view of the strong hold of science in our society.
To the modem consumer, information labeled as "scientifically
13
proven" often assumes a posture of "mystic infallibility. '
Of those industries initially resorting to comparative advertising, the pharmaceutical industry has been the most active.' 4
Comparative drug advertising, however, implicates unique social
(discussing Dell Computer's use of comparative advertising to compete with more
established marketers of PCs).
8 Burger King's comparative advertising campaign in the early 1980s, which
launched "the Burger Battles," was spectacularly effective; it caused Burger King to
post "the largest monthly gain in awareness of any advertiser," while McDonald's
"suffered the largest decline recorded to date by any advertiser." Joseph Winski,
Burger King Gets Awareness Boost, ADVERTISING AGE, Nov. 29, 1982, at 3, 3.
9 One hospital advertised its mortality rates from bypass surgery, but commentators disagree about the future of comparative advertising in this very sensitive
domain. See Linda J. Perry & Kari Super Palm, Hospitals Unlikely to Tout Mortality
Data, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Dec. 4, 1987, at 68, 68; Karl E. Super, Nation's Hospitals
Likely to Adopt Market Segmentation Techniques, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Aug. 15, 1986,
at 88, 90 (predicting that hospitals "may use comparative advertising to differentiate themselves" in terms of quality of care); Linda Little, Medicine's Uneasy Bid for
Business, MADISON AVENUE, May 1985, at 90, 98 (hospitals may someday use "direct,
point-by-point comparative advertising").
10 See Kevin T. Higgins, True MarketingAbsent in Economic-Development Efforts, MARKETING NEWS, Oct. 11, 1985, at 1, 1 (state economic development authorities have
engaged in comparative advertising to attract industry).
I I See Edmond R. Rosenthal, ComparativeAd, Weapon or Fad?, MARKETING TIMES,
Sept./Oct. 1976, at 10, 10.
12 See, e.g., Jerry B. Gotlieb & Dan Sarel, Comparative Advertising Effectiveness: The
Role of Involvement and Source Credibility, 20:1 J. OF ADVERTISING 38, 44 (1991) (effectiveness of comparative advertising increases when "a source of higher credibility
[e.g., science] is included in the advertisement"); Earl & Pride, supra note 5, at 24
(performance test results significantly increase the effectiveness of comparative advertising); Some Comparative Ads Work, O&M Concedes, supra note 5, at 6 (credibility of
comparative advertising is enhanced by "visual demonstrations of product superiority"); cf. Mary Ann Stutts, Comparative Advertising and Counterargument, 10:3 J. OF
ACAD. OF MARKETING Smi. 302, 302 (1982) (comparative advertising effectiveness
occurs when "readers of the advertisement must in some way accept the message
that is presented in the advertisement"); David A. Aaker & Donald Norris, Characteristics of TV Commercials Perceived as Informative, J. OF ADVERTISING RES., Apr./May
1982, at 61, 70 (noting that "people listen to ads to obtain information," and "informative commercials are perceived to be convincing, effective, and interesting").
13 United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
14 For a discussion of the results of a 1975 study, see Stephen W. Brown & Don-

1992]

LANHAM ACT LITIGATION

393

and competitive concerns. False comparative claims concerning
medicines can affect the health of millions. In most instances,
consumers, and even physicians, would be unable to meaningfully evaluate the claims and sales of the competing products
could be dramatically affected. Hence, the stakes involved in
these advertising campaigns - both the incentives to make a
false scientific establishment claim or litigate to stop one - can
be enormous.
The Lanham Act provides a private right of action for unfair
15
competition based on false scientific establishment claims.
Courts have recently addressed Lanham Act challenges to scientific establishment claims in advertising for products literally
ranging from dog food' 6 to prescription drugs.' 7 Cases involving
comparative drug advertising, however, stand in a class of their
own for several reasons. They can have profound implications
for public health and drug development. Consumers and physicians are particularly unable to evaluate the merits of these
claims. Moreover, they intersect with an extensive body of federal regulations governing drug advertising.
This article explores the public policy considerations and
legal standards in a Lanham Act litigation involving comparative
drug advertising based on scientific claims. To fully comprehend
these public policy considerations and legal standards, it is essential to consider the broader social and regulatory context in
which they operate.
Part II first examines the social utility of comparative drug
advertising and then addresses how comparative drug advertising is directly regulated by the federal government, particularly
the Federal Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). It shows that, while truthful comparative drug advertising can benefit consumers in many ways,
false comparative advertising may cause serious harm. The FDA
and the FTC have recognized, therefore, that the law should seek
to discourage false advertising, but not in an overly restrictive
way that might simultaneously chill truthful comparative adveraid W. Jackson, Comparative Television Advertising: Examining its Nature and Frequency,
6:4J. OF ADVERTISING 15 (1977).
15 See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
16 Alpo Petfoods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 720 F. Supp. 194 (D.D.C. 1989),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 913 F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1990), modified, 1991 WL 25793
(D.D.C. Feb. 8, 1991).
17 E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Stuart Pharmaceuticals, No. 90-1178, 1990 WL
159909 (D.N.J. Oct. 16, 1990).
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tising. Because the Lanham Act indirectly regulates comparative
advertising through private civil actions, courts must likewise
seek to strike a suitable balance in deciding Lanham Act claims
based on comparative drug advertising.
Part III shows how the Lanham Act has recently evolved into
an effective remedy for false comparative advertising and the elements of a basic claim. Previously, ancient legal principles limited the effectiveness of private false advertising claims. With
recent statutory changes, however, the Lanham Act has now matured into a very potent device for regulating false advertising.
Finally, Part IV addresses the legal standards governing scientific establishment claims under the Lanham Act. It explores
the common fact patterns in these cases and the legal and scientific issues involved in their resolution. In conclusion, it argues
that government agencies and courts should follow the same approach in regulating scientific establishment claims in comparative drug advertising.
II.

A.

COMPARATIVE DRUG ADVERTISING: PUBLIC POLICY AND
PUBLIC REGULATION

The Social Utility of Comparative Drug Advertising

Companies advertise to sell their products. Advertising,
however, is not simply a necessary evil of a market-based system.
Economists, advertisers, regulators and businessmen recognize
that honest and accurate comparative advertising can benefit
8

consumers. 1

1. Consumer Education
Truthful comparative advertising educates the consumer.
The FTC has found that this type of advertising may assist consumers in making informed purchases by providing them with
important product information.' 9 When consumers are unin18 See Study Cites Value of ComparativeAds But Warns Effect Hinges on Honesty, BROAD-

CASTING, Aug. 29, 1977, at 52, 52 (study by the National Advertising Review Board
of the Better Business Bureaus).
19 Posch, supra note 2, at 106. The FTC Policy Statement on comparative advertising notes:
The Commission has supported the use of brand comparisons
where the bases of comparison are clearly identified. Comparative advertising, when truthful and non-deceptive, is a source of important
information to consumers and assists them in making rational
purchase decisions.
Id. (citations omitted). See generally Stanley I. Tannenbaum & Andrew G. Kershaw,
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formed or misinformed about a product, the demand for that
product will not reflect its true utility. 2 ° Comparative advertising
may even help transform the modern consumer. One commentator has suggested that the very phenomenon of comparative advertising motivates the consumer to compare before buying. 2 ' In
other words, it induces the consumer to think.
In recent comments on proposed FDA regulations to govern
nutritional claims in food advertising, the FTC clearly indicated
that the communication of truthful information to consumers
would significantly contribute to the public welfare.2 2 The FTC
noted that truthful information can educate the public about important health issues:
[A]dvertising has played an important role in informing consumers about the relationship between diet and health. In the
early 1970's, for example, food manufacturers were advising
consumers to reduce cholesterol levels by substituting polyunsaturated fats for some saturated fats. Similarly, other advertisers promoted egg substitutes as a way to help meet the
American Heart Association's then-recommended levels of di23
etary cholesterol intake.
Thus, truthful advertising comprises a powerful method of disseminating information that may enable consumers to improve their
health. 24 Drug advertising directed to the public could, for example, educate consumers about the health consequences of particular
For and Against Comparative Advertising, ADVERTISING AGE, July 5, 1976, at 25, 25
(comparative advertising constitutes industry's own kind of consumerism);
Muehling & Kangun, supra note 4, at 112 (FTC support for comparative advertising
is based on view that it "provides consumers with more factual product information
on which to make intelligent purchase decisions"); Robert R. Harmon et al., The
Information Content of Comparative Magazine Advertisements, 12:4 J. OF ADVERTISING 10,
10 (1983) (comparative advertisements "have more information than noncomparative advertisements"); J.J. Boddewyn & Katherine Marton, ComparisonAdvertising and
Consumers, 7:4 J. OF CONTEMP. Bus. 135, 136 (1979) (consumer associations generally approve the use of comparative advertising).
20 See Howard Beales, Benefits and Costs of Label Information Programs, in BANBLURY
REPORT 6: PRODUCT LABELING AND HEALTH RISKS (Louis A. Morris et al., eds.,
1980); Ralph K. Winter, Advertising and Legal Theory, in ISSUES IN ADVERTISING: THE
ECONOMICS OF PERSUASION 15, 18 (David G. Tuerck ed., 1978).
21 Tannenbaum & Kershaw, supra note 19, at 25.
22 Comments of the Bureaus of Competition, Consumer Protectionand Economics of the Federal Trade Commission Submitted to the FDA in Response to a Request for Comments on its
Proposalto Amend the Rules Governing Health Messages on Food Labels and Labeling, at 1
(May 2, 1989) [hereinafter Comments Regarding Health Messages.] For the proposed
amendments, see 52 Fed. Reg. 28843 (1987).
23 Comments Regarding Health Messages, supra note 22, at 5-6 (footnotes omitted).
24 Id. at 10.
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illnesses and the drugs used to treat them.2 5
2.

Product Improvement

Comparative advertising motivates producers to enhance the
quality of their products. 2 6 Economists have stressed that comparative advertisements may induce competitors to improve the
quality of their products, 27 and empirical data support this
proposition.28
The FTC has long recognized that truthful comparative advertising may provide manufacturers with incentives to improve
their products. Thus, for example, the FTC recently concluded
that allowing manufacturers greater latitude to emphasize their
products' health benefits will typically increase the demand for
those products. 29 The increased consumer demand should then
induce manufacturers to produce more desirable products.
3.

Lower Prices and More Choices

Comparative price advertising encourages vigorous price
competition. 0 Courts have long maintained that comparative
price advertising may benefit consumers in this manner,3 ' and
substantial empirical data show that comparative price advertising lowers prices.3 2
25 James D. Dickinson, Ads to Consumers on the Hot Seat, DRUG Topics, June 21,
1982, at 63, 67.
26 See Al McClain, When it Comes to Commercials, Iacocca Wins Out, ADVERTISING
AGE, June 6, 1983, at M-30, M-32 (advertising executives feel that comparative advertising is advantageous because "it motivates the advertiser to improve his
products or suffer a bad comparison").
27 Michael B. Mazis et al., A Frameworkfor Evaluating Consumer Information Regulation, 45 J. OF MARKETING 11, 11-12 (Winter 1981).
28 See J. Howard Beales III, What State Regulators Should Learn From FTC Experience

in RegulatingAdvertising, 10J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 101, 102 (1991). For other
empirical studies, see Pauline M. Ippolito & Alan D. Mathios, Health Claims in Advertising and Labeling: A Study of the Cereal Market (FTC Bureau of Econ. 1989); Stutts,
supra note 12, at 302.
29 Comments Regarding Health Messages, supra note 22, at 10.
30 0. Randolph Rollins, Comparative Price Advertising, 33 Bus. LAw. 1771, 1774
(Apr. 1978).
31 See, e.g., Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 567-68 (9th Cir. 1968) ("To
prohibit use of a competitor's trademark for the sole purpose of identifying the
competitor's product would bar effective communication of claims of equivalence .... [T]he public interest would not be served by a rule of law which would
preclude sellers ... from advising consumers of knowledge that an identical product was being offered at one-third the price.").
32 See John R. Schroeter, Advertising and Competition in Routine Legal Service Markets:
An Empirical Investigation, 36J. OF INDUS. EcON. 49, 59 (1987); Beales, supra note 28,
at 102.
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Experience in the over-the-counter (OTC) drug market has
proven the value of comparative price advertising. In one of the
earliest and most notorious comparative price advertising campaigns, advertisements for Datril caused Johnson & Johnson to
substantially reduce its price for Tylenol. 3
Comparative advertising can also increase competition by
lowering barriers to market entry.34 Comparative advertising is
particularly effective in reducing market barriers when a few
manufacturers control the market by marching in lockstep.3 5 It
may be that, for this reason, market leaders have historically opposed comparative advertising.36
Comparative advertising may benefit all consumers even
though a majority of them may not directly use the information
conveyed by the advertising. As one commentator recently
observed:
All consumers benefit from advertising, even though a minority of consumers actively searches [sic] for products with lower
prices or particular attributes. Competition among manufacturers
33 See Tylenol Exec Speaks Out on DatrilPrice Ad, ADVERTISING AGE, Mar. 29, 1976,
at 1, 115 ("The Datril situation is apparently what the FTC had in mind when it
encouraged [comparative advertising] in 1971.... [Tihe subsequent price cut for
Tylenol [proved] a definite advantage for the consumer.").
34 See Comparative Advertising: Red in Tooth and Claw, supra note 4, at 79 (comparative advertising is an effective way for new brands to break into markets occupied by
entrenched rivals); Easwar S. Iyer, The Influence of Verbal Content and Relative Newness
on the Effectiveness of Comparative Advertising, 17:3 J. OF ADVERTISING 15, 20 (1988)
(comparative advertising is effective for "new brand introductions" because it "facilitates the creation of a clear product position"); William J. Byer & Ernest F.
Cooke, ComparativeAdvertising's Dilemma: How to Attack the Competition Without Alienating His Customer, 2 J. OF CONSUMER MARKETING 67, 68-69 (1985) (comparative advertising naming specific competing brands is "increasingly used to differentiate a
product or to introduce a new product name into the market").
35 See Morton Schnabel, Conscious Parallelism and Advertising Themes: The Case for
'Comparative'Advertising,7 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 11, 16 (1974-75) (comparative advertising may "reduce entry barriers in those situations where it is in fact
conscious parallelism that is dictating the choices being made in this regard by a
group of oligopoly firms.").
36 For example, McDonald's at one time urged others in the industry to avoid
comparative nutritional advertising. See Scott Hume, Mac Chief Explodes 'Burger
Wars', ADVERTISING AGE, Apr. 14, 1986, at 3, 3 (president of McDonald's Corporation, the leading fast food company, argues that continued used of comparative
advertising would be destructive to "the restaurant industry and invite more attacks
by nutrition extremists and the press"); Mark Schoifet, Quinlan Urges Halt in Comparative Ads, NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS, Apr. 21, 1986, at 1, 1 (McDonald's opposes
comparative advertising because it helps fuel attacks against fast food by "healthoriented consumer groups and a sensationalist press" and contributes to a negative
mindset about fast food). McDonald's eventually responded to the competitive
pressures and now posts nutritional information in its franchises.
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for the business of an informed minority is often sufficient to provide
benefits for all consumers. 7
B.

The Justificationfor Market Intervention

Comparative advertising benefits consumers only if it conveys truthful information.3 8 While truthful information empowers consumers to maximize utility, erroneous information may
lead them to make incorrect decisions.3 0 In this respect, false
comparative advertising can distort the market and could even
drive superior products from the market.4 ° Thus, deceptive advertising benefits no one - except perhaps the party engaging in
it.
The FTC's recent analysis of nutritional advertising illustrates the public policy risks of false comparative drug advertising. The FTC staff has noted that deceptive health claims can
damage the consumer in at least three ways. First, false claims
may induce consumers to change their diet in a way that actually
harms their health. Second, false claims may discourage consumers from making essential dietary changes or seeking essential
medical treatment. Finally, false claims may economically injure
consumers if they pay a premium price for a product that should
not command one.4 '
As the primary federal agency charged with policing truth in
the marketplace, the FTC recognizes that it must protect consumers from false advertising without discouraging truthful advertising.4 2
Because truthful advertising is valuable to
consumers, FTC regulation must be fine-tuned to screen out deceptive information without stifling the dissemination of truthful
information.4 3
37 See Schnabel, supra note 35, at 16 (emphasis added).
38 Robert Pitofsky, Advertising Regulation and the Consumer Movement, in ISSUES IN
ADVERTISING: THE ECON. OF PERSUASION 27, 28 (David G. Tuerck ed., 1978).
39

Id.at 28-29.

40 Id. at 28-34, 39.
41 Comments Regarding Health Messages, supra note 22, at 10-11.
42 The FTC staff has observed:

One of the FTC's major efforts is to regulate national advertising
in a way that protects consumers from deception, but at the same time
does not chill or prevent dissemination of truthful ads. The FTC has
developed widely accepted standards for the regulation of deceptive
advertising with minimum disruption to the dissemination of truthful
information.
Id. at 2 (footnotes omitted).
43 Id. In addressing the future of health claims relating to foods, therefore, the
FTC staff acknowledged that, "[f]rom a public policy standpoint, it is important to
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Economists and other commentators have long debated the
value of regulatory efforts to control deceptive advertising. Some
have argued that regulation is essential to address the market's
failure to control false advertising.44 Others, however, have suggested that the costs of regulation have more than offset its benefits.45 Still other commentators believe that the marketplace
itself deals best with false advertising. Simply put, if consumers
find that a product does not live up to its advertising, they will
not buy that product again.46
A laissez-faire approach may suffice to regulate advertising
for many goods, but it would not be an acceptable approach to
false advertising with respect to medications. Drugs are true
"credence" goods because they possess qualities that cannot be
evaluated through normal use. The assessment of a drug's qualities normally requires complex, time-consuming, and costly studies.47 Most economists agree that regulation of advertising is
necessary when the social costs of inaccurate or inadequate information are high and the consumer is unable to discern the
truth.48 These circumstances unquestionably apply in the case of
balance the benefits and risks of allowing food manufacturers greater latitude to
make health claims on labels. The most important risk is that some deceptive claims
will also be made." Id. at 10.
44 See Robert Pitofsky, Beyond Nader: Consumer Protection and the Regulation of Advertising, 90 HARV. L. REV. 661, 664-65 (1977).
45 See R.H. Coase, Advertising and Free Speech, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 11-13 (1977).
One economist, referring to the FTC's regulation of advertising, has argued:
[T]he FTC bought little consumer protection in exchange for the
more than $4 million it expended in the area of fraudulent and unfair
marketing practices, and the millions more that it forced the private
sector to expend in litigation and compliance. Besides wasting money
on red herrings, it inflicted additional social costs of unknown magnitude by impeding the free marketing of cheap substitute products, including foreign products of all kinds, fiber substitutes for animal furs,
costume jewelry, and inexpensive scents; by proscribing truthful designations; by harassing discount sellers; by obstructing a fair market
test for products of debatable efficacy; and by imposing on sellers the
costs of furnishing additional information and on buyers the costs of
absorbing that information.
RICHARD A. POSNER, REGULATION OF ADVERTISING BY THE FTC 21 (1973) (citations
omitted).
46 See Michael R. Darby & Edi Karni, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of
Fraud, 16J. LAW & ECON. 67 (1973).
47 Id. at 68-69.
48 PETER ASCH, CONSUMER SAFETY REGULATION 55 (1988); see also Ronald Hirshhorn, Regulating Quality in Product Markets, in THE REGULATION Or QUALITY 55, 57-60
(Donald N. Dewees, ed., 1983) (with respect to credence goods, consumers are illequipped to evaluate product claims and to reach informed decisions regarding
their quality).
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drugs:
The most obvious examples [of credence goods requiring government regulation] occur in food and drug markets, where
the consequences of unsafe products are exceptionally serious. While manufacturers do have safety incentives, they may
be willing to incur risks that are socially unacceptable; and
consumers have little ability to obtain or interpret risk
4 9 information beyond that which the manufacturers supply.
When the market cannot reasonably be expected to function
properly, some form of regulation is essential. In these instances,
regulation may protect consumers by ensuring truth in advertising.5 ° We first address direct regulation of drug advertising by the
federal government. The balance of this article then focuses on a
complementary system of indirect regulation through private civil
actions under the Lanham Act.
C.

Direct Regulation of Drug Advertising

The FDA and FTC jointly regulate drug advertising.5 ' The
FDA exclusively regulates prescription-drug labeling and advertising. For OTC drugs, however, the FDA regulates labeling,
49 ASCH, supra note 48, at 55. The FTC Bureau of Competition has acknowledged that it is difficult for consumers to evaluate the veracity of health claims.
Comments Regarding Health Messages, supra note 22, at 16.
50 With credence goods, moreover, regulation enjoys several potential
advantages:
The government, in intervening in the information market, has
several potential advantages. It can attain economies of scale in research of the kind just mentioned. It operates at reduced transaction
costs as it can impose uniform rules on numerous parties who in private agreements could not come nearly as easily to such a result. The
government may thus induce uniform pricing methods, uniform grading, and other forms of standardization.
The government may also force suppliers to divulge information
that they would have kept from private agencies and use this information to certify the presence of qualities or features.
EJAN MACKAAY, ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION AND LAW 155 (1982).
51 The FDA and FTC have concurrent jurisdiction over drug advertising. See 21
U.S.C. § 352 (1988) (setting forth FDA requirements for the labeling of drugs and
devices); 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1988) (providing approval mechanism for new drugs);
15 U.S.C. § 45 (1988) (declaring FTC authority in prohibiting unfair methods of
competition); 15 U.S.C. § 52 (1988) (prohibiting false advertising and deceptive
acts or practices); 15 U.S.C. § 54 (1988) (providing for imposition of penalties for
false advertising). See also Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 361 F. Supp. 948 (D.D.C.
1973), aff'd as modified, 562 F.2d 799 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 950
(1978) (FDA and FTC have concurrent jurisdiction with respect to labeling and
advertising claims concerning over-the-counter drugs). The FDA and the FTC
have, by agreement, divided the responsibility for the regulation of over-thecounter drugs. See infra note 52 and accompanying text.
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while the FTC regulates advertising. 52
In 1975, the FDA adopted extensive regulations concerning
prescription drug advertising. These regulations are designed,
among other things, to insure that claims are supported by credible scientific evidence. 53 Under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FD&CA), the FDA may consider a drug to be
misbranded 54 and seize it, if the drug's advertising violates these
regulations. 55 The FDA may also seek injunctive relief 5 6 or criminal penalties,5 7 although the Agency has rarely invoked these
powers. It has instead successfully resolved disputed claims
through negotiations with pharmaceutical manufacturers. The
FDA has assisted industry in complying voluntarily with its advertising regulations by publishing a number of comparative drug
advertising guidelines.5 8
The FTC, on the other hand, has litigated many false advertising claims and has articulated a clear analytical framework. In
essence, the FTC will act when it believes that a material representation, omission or practice is likely to mislead a reasonable
consumer. 59 The FTC seeks to balance the advantages of truthful advertising against the costs of regulation.60
The FTC first addressed the need for reasonable evidence to
52 36 Fed. Reg. 18,539 (1971).
53 21 C.F.R. § 202.1 (1991). Some of these regulations are addressed infra at
notes 84-101 and accompanying text.
54 21 U.S.C. § 352 (1988).
55 21 U.S.C. § 334 (1988).
56 21 U.S.C. § 332(a) (1988).
57 21 U.S.C. § 333 (1988).
58 See Comparative Drug Advertising Working Guidelines, F.D.A. Letter (July 6, 1982).
See also Clarificationof FDA Policy on "Institutional," "Corporate" or "Health Message"
Advertising Practices (FDA Sept. 8, 1985); Policy Guidance, Pre-Publication Review of
PromotionalMaterials (FDA Sept. 1985); David Banks, Excerpt of Comments Regarding
PrescriptionDrug Advertising, RAPS Annual Meeting (Sept. 27, 1988); Lloyd G. Millstein, FDA Policy on ComparativePrescription Drug Advertising, 17 DRUG INFO. J. 63, 65
(1983) ("The FDA's primary purpose is to ensure that prescription drug advertising is not false or misleading. We want to be able to assure the public that the
physician does not prescribe on the basis of promotion or less than full information. Because of the sensitive nature of medical and pharmaceutical information,
the need to adhere to strict government regulations is vital. There is no room for
disputed or less-than-factual information.").
59 See FTC Policy Statement on Deception, reprinted in 4 ArNrrRUST AND TRADE REG.
REP. (CCH) 13,205, at 20, 911-20, 917 (Oct. 14, 1983).
60 At one time, the FTC prohibited advertising that might potentially mislead
anyone. The test came to be known as the "fool's test" because the FTC insisted
on advertising so clear that, "in the words of the prophet Isaiah, 'wayfaring men,
though fools, shall not err therein.' " Charles of the Ritz Distrib. Corp. v. FTC, 143
F.2d 676, 680 (2d Cir. 1944). The FTC abandoned the fool's test in In the Matter of
Heinz W. Kirchner, 63 F.T.C. 1282 (1963), aff'd, 337 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1964).
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support advertising claims in In the Matter of Heinz W. Kirchner.6
In that case, Kirchner promoted a swimming-aid device as "safe"
to the extent that even poor swimmers would be unsinkable. But
Kirchner made those claims without any meaningful evidence to
support them. The Commission found that Kirchner marketed a
potentially dangerous product and claimed that it was safe and
unsinkable without first determining whether the product possessed those qualities.6 2
The FTC held that Kirchner could not make such unproven
assertions in complete disregard of the consumer's health and
safety. The FTC concluded:
[A]n advertiser is under a duty, before he makes any representation which, if false, could cause injury to the health or personal
safety of the user of the advertised product, to make reasonable inquiry into the truth or falsity of the representation. He
should have in his possession such information as would satisfy a reasonable and prudent businessman, acting in goodfaith, that such representation was true. To make a representation of this. sort, without
such minimum substantiation, is to demonstrate a reckless disregard for human health and safety, and is clearly an unfair
and deceptive practice.6 3
A decade later, the FTC addressed the "minimum substantiation" requirement in the context of pharmaceutical advertising. In
In the Matter of Pfizer, Inc.,' Pfizer's advertisements claimed that its
sunburn treatment "relieves painfast" and "actually anesthetizes nerves
in sensitive sunburned skin." 6 5 The FTC enforcement staff argued
that Pfizer could not make these claims without first conducting a
reasonable investigation to substantiate its claims. 66 The FTC staff
argued, moreover, that controlled scientific tests were required to
satisfy the reasonable investigation requirement.
Pfizer agreed that manufacturers must first conduct a reasonable investigation before making advertising claims. Pfizer conceded, moreover, that it had not performed any scientific tests. But
Pfizer argued that it had performed a reasonable investigation by
collecting a substantial body of pre-existing medical literature and
clinical data demonstrating the efficacy of its product.6 7 The FTC
61
62
63
64
65

63
Id.
Id.
81
Id.

F.T.C. 1282 (1963).
at 1295.
at 1294 (emphasis added).
F.T.C. 23 (1972).
at 24 (emphasis in original).

66
67

Id. at 54.
Id. at 41-42.
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surveyed the state of the art and concluded that, in fact, most scientists would have accepted the evidence marshalled by Pfizer to support its claims. Accordingly, the FTC rejected the proposition of its
staff that controlled scientific tests were essential to satisfy the "reasonable investigation" requirement as a matter of law.
The FTC also recognized that general principles accepted by
the community of pharmacologists to evaluate efficacy claims coincided with the FDA's principles governing efficacy determinations.
Therefore, in determining whether the advertiser had conducted a
reasonable investigation of its efficacy claims, the FTC could use the
FDA's standards. Indeed, the FTC wrote:
[I]t would not seem reasonable to suppose that the [FTC]
would deliberately take a position disregarding clinical experience particularly since that position would be contrary to the position
taken by the [FDA] in the adequacy testing of drugs. It would seem,
therefore, that the [FTC] under its announced policies would
defer to the agency that is specifically chargedby Congress with determining the adequacy and safety of drug products.6 8
Through the 1970s, the FTC continued to insist that pharmaceutical companies have a "reasonable basis" for medical claims in
OTC drug advertising. In In the Matter of Porter & Dietsch, Inc. ,69 the
respondents advertised that their OTC drug constituted "[a]
PROVEN and SOUND method" for weight reduction with "clinically tested ingredients." 7 ° The respondents, however, conceded
that they had no scientific data or other information to support their
weight-loss representations. 7' In deciding to enjoin the advertisements, the FTC reiterated its position that pharmaceutical manufacturers must have a reasonable basis for their claims.7 2
An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)recently elaborated on the
FTC's approach to these issues in In the Matter of Schering Corp.7" In
that case, Schering advertised "Fibre Trim" as an effective weightloss and weight-maintenance product. The advertisements included
general claims about Fibre Trim's health benefits74 but did not refer
to the substantive basis for the claims. Because the advertisements
contained objective statements about Fibre Trim's weight reducing
68 Id. at 55 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
69 90 F.T.C. 770 (1977), aff'd, 605 F.2d 294 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
950 (1980).
70

71
72

Id. at 865.
Id. at 868.
Id. at 866.

73 No. 9232 (Initial Decision, Sept. 16, 1991).
74

Id. at 68.
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qualities, the ALJ required Schering to have a reasonable basis for
the claims. 75 Because the advertisements implied that Schering had
a scientific basis for the claims, Schering was required to substantiate them with proof acceptable to the relevant scientific
76
community.
The ALJ then considered the nature of the required substantiation. 77 Because Fibre Trim's advertisements contained claims of
"health benefits," the ALJ found that "a relatively high level of substantiation, typically scientific tests" would be required because
health representations comprise "credence" claims. 78 The ALJ
found that, given the revenues generated by the product, Schering
could reasonably be expected to conduct two well-controlled clinical
trials to substantiate its claims. The ALJ noted that the benefit of
truthful health claims was obvious, given that obesity was a large
public health problem, and that, because of Fibre Trim's high cost, a
false claim would substantially harm consumers. The ALJ credited
expert testimony indicating that, at a minimum, two clinical tests
should be conducted to establish the validity of Fibre Trim's
claims. 79 Finally, the ALJ reviewed Schering's data and concluded
that the studies Schering had relied on to substantiate its claims
were fundamentally flawed. 80
In dealing over the years with implied substantiation claims, like
75 Id. (citing Thompson Medical Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 104 F.T.C.
648, 839 (1984), aft'd, 791 F.2d 189 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1086
(1987)).
76 Id.

77 Because Fibre Trim's advertising did not refer to the scientific evidence for its
claims, the ALJ stated that the following factors determined the adequacy of the
substantiation: (1) the product involved; (2) the type of claim; (3) the benefits of a
truthful claim; (4) the ease of developing substantiation for the claim; (5) the consequences of a false claim; and (6) the nature of the substantiation experts in the field
would agree is reasonable. Id. (citing In the Matter of Pfizer, Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23, 64
(1972); Thompson Medical, 104 F.T.C. at 840).
78 Id. at 68-69 (quoting Thompson Medical, 104 F.T.C. at 822 n.60). The ALJ
noted:
Because of the placebo effect, it is difficult for consumers to evaluate
Schering's Fibre Trim claims even if they consume it for an extended
period of time. Credence claims like these which are "the sort that
consumers would not be able to verify easily for themselves" therefore require a high standard of proof such as scientifically adequate
clinical trials.
Id. at 69 (quoting Thompson Medical, 104 F.T.C. at 822-23).
79 Id.
80 Id. at 70-71.

The ALJ noted that one of Schering's own scientists doubted
whether the data would support an application for a new prescription drug or for
OTC marketing. Id. at 42. He also cited specific findings by an FDA advisory expert panel that conflicted with Schering's claims. Id. at 45.
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those in In re Pfizer, Inc. and In re Schering Corp., the FTC has stressed
that its decision to act in any particular case depends on a number of
factors relevant to the benefits and costs of substantiating a particular claim. 8 In essence, the FTC will be more inclined to act when
false health claims pose substantial risks to consumers and less
inclined to act when questionable claims entail only de minimis economic concerns. 8 2 In short, the FTC will require greater substantiation as the risk to the consumer increases.8 3 When it acts,
moreover, the FTC will rely heavily, if not conclusively, on FDA
standards.

D. Establishment Claims
The FTC does not use a flexible standard to evaluate express
establishment claims. In an express claim, the advertiser actually
represents that it has a particular level of substantiation. The
FTC insists that these claims be supported by the same level of
substantiation that they communicate to the consumer. Thus, if
an advertisement states that a particular level of proof supports
81 FTC Policy Statemeni Regarding Advertising Substantiation Program, 49 Fed. Reg.
30,999 (1984).
82 See Comments Regarding Health Messages, supra note 22, at 11-12 ("Because the
potential benefits and risks of particular claims vary widely, we believe that [the
regulation] can best be accomplished by a flexible approach to evaluating individual claims rather than a rigid rule that applies to every possible claim. This is particularly true for the area of deceptive health claims on food labeling because some
unsubstantiated claims could result in health injury while others present only de
minimis risks of economic harm.").
83 Id. at 16 ("Under this flexible approach, the required level of substantiation
rises with the potential for consumer injury should the claim turn out to be false.
For example, where the particular product claim raises concerns about possible
injury to the health or safety of consumers or will be difficult or impossible for
consumers to assess for themselves, the [FTC] requires a relatively high level of
substantiation."). Thus, the FTC will consider, on a case by case basis, the risk of
an erroneous claim to the public health:
[F]or example, when FTC officials commented on the Kellogg's
All-Bran ad in 1985 they noted that they were aware of no grave
health or safety risks that flowed from choosing All-Bran over another
breakfast cereal. In contrast, there are instances where consumption
of the food as advertised does raise health or safety concerns. In In re
Estee, Inc. [102 F.T.C. 1804 (1983)], for example, the Commission
alleged claims that Estee's advertising encouraged diabetics to consume food without adequate substantiation about how those foods affected blood sugar levels. [Citation omitted.] In such cases, the health
or safety risk obviously demands a high level of substantiation. ...
The flexible substantiation doctrine used by the Commission would
allow the FDA to deal firmly with these cases without jeopardizing
truthful claims.
Id. at 20 n.42.
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the product's claims, e.g., that three major clinical studies establish a particular representation, then that level of proof must exist to substantiate the representation.84
The FTC first addressed an express establishment claim concerning a drug's efficacy in In the Matter of American Home Products
Corp.8 In that case, American Home Products Corp. (American)
claimed that Anacin's superiority had been proven by scientific
tests. 86 The FTC found that American could not substantiate its
claim. The FTC noted that the express claim of "proven" superiority would mislead consumers into believing that scientific tests
actually showed Anacin to be the most effective OTC analgesic.
The FTC likewise recognized that it would be appropriate to
consider FDA regulations governing scientific evidence when
evaluating these establishment claims.8 ' The FTC credited expert testimony, received in the course of the administrative proceeding, indicating that the FDA's regulations reflect good
scientific practice. 8
The FTC further clarified its position on establishment
claims in two later cases dealing with pharmaceutical advertising.
In In the Matter of Bristol-Myers Co. ,89 the manufacturer of Bufferin
advertised that "[s]cientific tests show that ...

Bufferin delivers

twice as much pain reliever as simple aspirin." 90 It also advertised that "[n]ew clinical evidence says Excedrin [is better than
aspirin]. In a major hospital study, two Excedrin work better in
relieving pain than twice as many aspirin tablets."' The FTC
noted that words such as "medically recognized" and "clinic
tested" would lead consumers to believe that the claims have
been established by scientific research generally
acceptable to the
92
relevant scientific or medical community.
84 Comments Regarding Health Messages, supra note 22, at 13. See also FTC Policy
Statement Regarding Advertising Substantiation Program, 49 Fed. Reg. 30,999 (1984)

("When the substantiation claim is express (e.g., 'tests prove', 'doctors recommend', and 'studies show'), the Commission expects the firm to have at least the
advertised level of substantiation.").
85 98 F.T.C. 136 (1981), aft'd, 695 F.2d 681 (3d Cir. 1982), modified, 103 F.T.C.

528 (1984).
86 Id. at 363.
87 Id. at 378.

88 Id. at 381-82.
89 102 F.T.C. 21 (1983), aff'd sub nom. Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 738 F.2d 554
(2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1189 (1985).
90 Id. at 324.
91 Id.

at 325.

92 Id. at 330.
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In resolving this and similar cases, 93 the FTC borrowed liberally from FDA regulations. Thus, like the FDA, the FTC required tests conducted pursuant to a written protocol by
independent and experienced investigators using randomized
treatment and control groups.9 4 The tests had to be "doubleblinded," so that neither the investigator nor the subject knew
whether active drugs or placebos were being utilized.9 5 Further,
when the studies were completed, data had to be statistically and
clinically evaluated using generally accepted scientific methodologies.9 6 Finally, to support a comparative efficacy claim, at least
two valid studies were required. 9 ' The FTC explained that it relied on the FDA's criteria because they reflected those accepted
in the relevant scientific community.98
The FTC next addressed establishment claims in pharma-

ceutical advertising in In the Matter of Thompson Medical Co. 99
There, Thompson Medical advertised that its topical analgesic
drug had been shown to be more effective than orally-ingested
aspirin. The FTC found some of Thompson Medical's claims to
be false because the claims were not supported by the appropriate scientific evidence. The Agency noted:
'Establishment claims' are claims that the efficacy of a drug has
been scientifically prove[n], i.e., 'established.' In our three recent cases, we stated that we require such claims to be substantiated by evidence sufficient to satisfy the relevant scientific
community of the claim's truth. We further stated that the appropriate level of substantiation for other claims would be determined by considering factors such as the harm to
consumers if the claim were false.10 0
As in prior cases involving establishment claims, the FTC relied on
93 See In the Matter of Sterling Drugs, Inc., 102 F.T.C. 395 (1983), aff'd sub nom.
Sterling Drugs, Inc. v. F.T.C., 741 F.2d 1146 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S.
1084 (1985).
94 Bristol-Myers, 102 F.T.C. at 334-37; Sterling Drugs, 102 F.T.C. at 763-71.
95 Bristol-Myers, 102 F.T.C. at 335; Sterling Drugs, 102 F.T.C. at 803.
96 Bristol-Myers, 102 F.T.C. at 336; Sterling Drugs, 102 F.T.C. at 803.
97 Bristol-Myers, 102 F.T.C. at 337; Sterling Drugs, 102 F.T.C. at 803.
98 Bristol-Myers, 102 F.T.C. at 339.
99 104 F.T.C. 648 (1984), aff'd, 791 F.2d 189 (1D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1086 (1987).
100 Id. at 821-22 n.59 (relying on In the Matter of American Home Products
Corp., 98 F.T.C. 136 (1981), aff'dsub nom. American Home Products Corp. v.Johnson &Johnson, 695 F.2d 681 (3d Cir. 1982), modified, 103 F.T.C. 528 (1984); In the
Matter of Sterling Drugs, Inc., 102 F.T.C. 395 (1983), aff'd sub nom. Sterling Drugs,
Inc. v. F.T.C., 741 F.2d 1146 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1084 (1985); In
the Matter of Bristol-Myers Co., 102 F.T.C. 21 (1983), aff'd sub nom. Bristol-Myers
Co. v. F.T.C. 738 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1189 (1985)).
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FDA criteria to evaluate the quality of the scientific evidence cited to
support the advertising claims.'°'
The FTC's approach to the regulation of establishment claims
effectively balances the competing interests. The FTC seeks to protect the public from false and deceptive advertising while simultaneously encouraging the dissemination of useful information. In
evaluating claims of efficacy and safety, moreover, the FTC is appropriately guided by the scientific standards of the FDA, the Agency
primarily responsible for regulating pharmaceutical products.
When a pharmaceutical manufacturer advertises that its product enjoys scientifically-proven superiority, whether in terms of efficacy or safety, the claim conveys powerful information. If the
company lacks the scientific evidence to establish the claim, the
company misleads the public and may profoundly harm consumers
and competition in the process.
III.

PRIVATE REGULATION OF FALSE ADVERTISING UNDER THE
LANHAM ACT

Short of governmental action or a competitor's agreement to
abide by industry standards, an aggrieved manufacturer has only
one effective remedy to combat false comparative advertising: an
action under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.' °2 Despite the
101 Id. at 828-29.
102 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988). Section 1125(a) provides:
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services,
or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name,
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which (1) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive
as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with
another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or
her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person, or
(2) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the
nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or
another person's goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is
likely to be damaged by such act.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988).
For general discussions of false advertising claims under Section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act, see Paul E. Pompeo, To Tell the Truth: ComparativeAdvertising and Lanham Act Section 43(a), 36 CATH. UNIv. L. REV. 565 (1987); Garrett J. Waltzer, Monetary Relief for False Advertising Claims Arising Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 34
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 953 (1987); Gary S. Marx, Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act: A Statutory Cause of Action for False Advertising, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 383 (1983); Thomas
J. Donegan, Jr., Section 4 3(a) of the Lanham Act as a PrivateRemedy for FalseAdvertising,
37 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 264 (1982).
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Lanham Act's long history, this remedy did.not reach its full potency until 1988 and has not yet been fully tested in challenging
comparative advertising premised on false scientific establishment claims.
A.

The Evolution of Lanham Act Jurisprudence

Trademark law protects the psychological function of merchandising symbols."' 3 Even though false advertising may
weaken the commercial magnetism of another's trademark, federal law did not always provide an effective remedy against it. In
fact, courts historically limited the reach of trademark law to
"palming-off" claims - those involving false designations of origin. Many early cases construed the Lanham Act to go no
0 4
further. 1
In 1954, the courts broke free of the palming-off paradigm
and extended the Lanham Act to false advertising. In L 'Aiglon
Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., t° 5 the plaintiff, a dress manufacturer, advertised a dress in a national advertising campaign. The
defendant offered an inferior dress at a lower price but used a
picture of the plaintiff's dress in its advertising. The plaintiff did
not claim that the defendant was palming-off its inferior product.
Rather, the plaintiff argued that the defendant was misleading
consumers by implying that they could obtain a dress similar to
the plaintiff's but for less money. The district court, finding no
palming-off claim, dismissed the complaint.
The Third Circuit reversed. The court broadly held that the
In Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203
(1942), the Supreme Court explained the nature of trademark law in these classic
terms:
The protection of trade-marks is the law's recognition of the psychological function of symbols. If it is true that we live by symbols, it
is no less true that we purchase goods by them. A trade-mark is a
merchandising short-cut which induces a purchaser to select what he
wants, or what he had been led to believe he wants. The owner of a
mark exploits this human propensity by making every effort to impregnate the atmosphere of the market with the drawing power of a
congenial symbol. Whatever the means employed, the aim is the same
- to convey through the mark, in the minds of potential customers,
the desirability of the commodity upon which it appears. Once this is
attained, the trade-mark owner has something of value. If another
poaches upon the commercial magnetism of the symbol he has created, the owner can obtain legal redress.
Id. at 205.
104 See Samson Crane Co. v. Union Nat. Sales, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 218 (D. Mass.
1949); Chamberlain v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 186 F.2d 923 (9th Cir. 1951).
105 118 F. Supp. 251 (E.D. Pa. 1953), rev'd, 214 F.2d 649 (3d Cir. 1954).
103
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Lanham Act prohibited unfair competition through false advertising as well as palming-off. In sweeping terms, the court found
that Congress, in adopting section 43(a), created a federal statu0 6
tory tort similar to the common law tort of unfair competition.1
Despite the Third Circuit's breakthrough analysis in L 'Aiglon
Apparel, other precedents continued to limit the Lanham Act's
potential to control false advertising, particularly false comparative advertising. In BernardFood Industries v. Dietene Co. ,107 for example, Dietene distributed a comparison sheet that listed the
ingredients of its custard and a custard manufactured by Bernard
Food. Dietene incorrectly indicated that Bernard Food's custard
did not contain any egg. The Seventh Circuit rejected Bernard
Food's false advertising claim, finding that "false advertising or
representations made by a defendant about a plaintiff's product
are not covered by section 43(a)."' °
The holding in Bernard Food was often criticized (and sometimes avoided) in the almost twenty years that it remained valid
law. In Skil Corp. v. Rockwell International Corp.,1°9 for example,
Skil challenged Rockwell's comparative advertising campaign
concerning the companies' competing drill and jigsaw products.
Rockwell claimed product superiority based on "test data generated by an independent product testing organization." "°
Rockwell, relying on Bernard Food, moved to dismiss Skil's Lan106 In rejecting the defendant's argument that Congress intended to limit the
Lanham Act to palming-off claims, the Third Circuit wrote:
[W]e reject this entire approach to the statute. We find nothing in
the legislative history of the Lanham Act to justify the view that this
section is merely declarative of existing law ....
It seems to us that
Congress has defined a statutory rivil wrong of false representation of
goods in commerce and has given a broad class of suitors injured or
likely to be injured by such wrong the right to relief in the federal
courts. This statutory tort is defined in language which differentiates
it in some particulars from similar wrongs which have developed and
have become defined in the judge made law of unfair competition.
Perhaps this statutory tort bears closest resemblance to the already
noted tort of false advertising to the detriment of a competitor, as
formulated by the American Law Institute out of materials of the
evolving common law of unfair competition ....
But however similar
to or different from pre-existing law, here is a provision of a federal
statute which, with clarity and precision adequate for judicial administration, creates and defines rights and duties and provides for their
vindication in the federal courts.
L'Aiglon Apparel, 214 F.2d at 651 (citations omitted).
107 415 F.2d 1279 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 912 (1970).
108 Id. at 1283 (citations omitted).
109 375 F. Supp. 777 (N.D. Il. 1974).
1O Id. at 780.
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ham Act claim. The court concluded, however, that Bernard Food
did not govern because Rockwell's comparative claims involved
more than simple representations "made by a defendant about a
plaintiff's product." The court reasoned that any comparative
advertising necessarily involves some statement about both
products. "i
The Skil court correctly characterized the holding in Bernard
Food as illogical.' 12 Congress later agreed. In the Trademark Law
Revision Act of 1988,'1 Congress expressly amended section
43(a) to overrule Bernard Food."1 4 Congress concluded that the
holding was "illogical on both practical and public policy levels
and that the public policy of deterring acts of unfair competition
will be served if [sjection 43(a) is amended to make clear that
misrepresentations about another's products are as actionable as
'
misrepresentations about one's own."

15

Congress also clearly indicated that it had adopted the Lan-

ham Act in general, and section 43(a) in particular, to protect
competitors and consumers." 6 Congress noted that "[t]rademark
law protects the public by making consumers confident that they
purchase those brands
can identify brands they prefer and' t can
7
without being confused or misled." "
I1 Id. at 782-83. The court reasoned that, if a competitor makes a false statement about another's product in comparative advertising, he is also falsely claiming
that his own product is superior. Id. at 782 n. 10. Hence, the competitor necessarily
makes some misrepresentation about its own product. Id.
112 Id. ("With due respect to the Court [in Bernard Food], it does not seem logical
to distinguish between a false statement about the plaintiff's product and a false
statement about the defendant's product in a case where the particular statement is
contained in comparison advertising by the defendant, such that in the first instance the plaintiff does not have a cause of action whereas in the latter he does.").
113 Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935 (1988).
'"4 See S. REP. No. 515, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5603-04.
115 Id. at 5603.
116 See id. at 5577 ("The purpose of the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988 is to
... improve the law's protection of the public from counterfeiting, confusion, and
deception.").
117 Id. at 5580. Some courts have correctly indicated that section 43(a) actions
are not the proper vehicle through which to vindicate solely the public's interest in
health and safety. See American Home Products Corp. v. Johnson &Johnson, 672
F. Supp. 135, 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). With some showing of competitive injury, however, the courts should consider the public's interest in health and safety. Congress
explicitly reaffirmed that proposition in the legislative history to the Trademark Revision Act of 1988. See S. REP. No. 515, supra note 114, at 5577 ("The purpose of the
[Act] is to ... improve the law's protection of the public ... ").
Moreover, in a case of comparative drug advertising, where consumers may be
confronted with a choice of two competing medications, it is difficult to envision an
instance of consumer confusion without concomitant competitive injury. The com-
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Many cases under the Lanham Act explicitly consider the
consumer's welfare,1" 8 particularly when dealing with claims involving products vital to consumer well-being." 9 A competitor's
interest in fair competition and the public's interest in truthful
advertising are coterminous. 120 Under section 43(a), therefore, a
plaintiff-competitor, while vindicating its own interests, simultaneously serves as the "vicarious avenger of the defendant's customers." 121 This is true, of course, even though Congress may
not have given consumers standing to sue in their own right under
22
section 43(a). 1
petitive injury necessarily derives from the consumer confusion. At the same time,
it is difficult to envision consumer confusion that does not result in competitive
injury. Therefore, the sterile proposition underlying this line of authority seems to
conflict with the legislative history and makes very little sense as a matter of law. See
Upjohn Co. v. American Home Products Corp., 598 F. Supp. 550, 557-58 (S.D.N.Y.
1984); Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Thompson Medical Co., Inc., 672 F. Supp. 679, 690
(S.D.N.Y. 1985).
118 See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 822 F.2d 28, 31 (6th Cir.
1987) ("Protecting consumers from false or misleading advertising ...is an important goal of the [Lanham Act] and a laudable public policy to be served."); Vidal
Sassoon v. Bristol-Myers Co., 661 F.2d 272, 273 (2d Cir. 1981) ("We are... reluctant to accord the language of § 43(a) a cramped construction, lest rapid advances
in advertising and marketing methods outpace technical revisions in statutory language and finally defeat the clear purpose of Congress in protecting the consumer."); Hobart Corp. v. Welbilt Corp., No. 1:89CV1726, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14447, at *33 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 4, 1989). ("The statute at issue here, the Lanham
Act, is designed to protect the consuming public.").
119 See, e.g., McNeilab, Inc. v. American Home Products Corp., 848 F.2d 34, 35
(2d Cir. 1988) (Lanham Act claims involving advertising for over-the-counter medications will "protect the public from inaccurate safety claims"); Syntex Laboratories, Inc. v. Norwich Pharmacal Co., 437 F.2d 566, 569 (2d Cir. 1971) (advertising
claims involving pharmaceutical products warrant a "stricter standard" when determining trademark infringement); cf. Energy Four, Inc. v. Dornier Medical Systems,
Inc., 765 F. Supp. 724, 735 (N.D. Ga. 1991) (false advertising claims concerning
medical devices warrant corrective advertising in view of the inherent public health
concerns); Upjohn Co. v. Riahom Corp., 641 F. Supp. 1209, 1225 (D. Del. 1986)
(injunction warranted in Lanham Act false advertising action involving hair growth
product because defendants were "thumbing their noses at United States drug
regulations").
120 Albert Robin & Howard B. Barnaby, Jr., Comparative Advertising: A Skeptical
View, 67 TRADEMARK REP. 358, 361 (1977) ("When the public is protected from
confusion as a result of trademark infringement litigation, the trademark owner is
protected in his good will.").
121 Ely-Norris Safe Co. v. Mosler Safe Co., 7 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1925) (Learned
Hand, J.), rev'd on other grounds, 273 U.S. 132 (1927). See generally, Robert S. Saunders, Replacing Skepticism: An Economic Justificationfor Competitors'Actionsfor False Advertising Under Section 43(a) of the Latham Act, 77 VA. L. REV. 563 (1991) (arguing that
consumers benefit when competitors police the market-place of information
through private actions).
122 Standing to sue, and the interests served by a type of suit, may differ. Therefore, the fact that a consumer does not have a right to sue under the Lanham Act
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Elements of a Modern Lanham Act Claimfor False Advertising

A modern Lanham Act claim for false advertising is governed by five essential elements. A plaintiff must show:
(1) that the defendant has made false or misleading statements... ; (2) that there is actual deception or at least a ten-

dency to deceive a substantial portion of the intended
audience; (3) that the deception is material in that it is likely to
influence purchasing decisions; (4) that the advertised goods
traveled in interstate commerce; and (5) that there is a likelihood of injury to 123
the plaintiff in terms of declining sales, loss
of good will, etc.

The first element itself entails two distinct inquiries: what is the
message, and is it false or misleading?
In determining what message is conveyed by an advertisement,
a court may consider how a particular term in the advertisement is
commonly used and understood. If the advertisement is directed to
those, in a particular field or profession, the court may consider how
the words in the advertisement would be commonly understood by
that field or profession. 24 If the advertisement is directed to the
public, the court may consider how the words used in the advertisement would be commonly understood by the public.' 2 5 The court
does not mean that his or her interests (as a consumer) are not served by the Act;
nor does it mean that the standards governing a claim under the Act should not be
defined with the interests of consumers in mind.
123 U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Philadelphia, 898 F.2d 914,
922-23 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 58 (1990) (quoting Max Daetwyler Corp. v.
Input Graphics, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 165, 171 (E.D. Pa. 1982)).
124 See, e.g., Hobart Corp. v. Welbilt Corp., No. 1:89CV1726, 1989 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14447, * 1 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 4, 1989) (mixing machine manufacturer claimed
its machine had higher "yield" and produced more "product" in mixing dough; to
ascertain meaning of advertisement's reference to "yield" and "product," court
considered how terms are used in the business of food preparation; court cited
experts' testimony as evidence of how terms are commonly used and understood).
125 In American Home Products Corp. v. Abbott Laboratories, 522 F. Supp.
1035, 1042 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), the court determined that an advertising claim that the
defendant's OTC medication "stops pain immediately" was false "based on the
meaning of the words, the context in which the words are used, both grammatical
and commercial, and the intent with which the words are being used by this defendant." To determine the meaning of the words, the court referred to dictionaries
and an understanding of the term "immediate" as "provided by the FDA drug
panel report .. " Id. Thus, "[in the relevant context," the word "unambiguously" had a false meaning. Id. The court reasoned that "[tihe commercial context,
like the grammatical, helps define the meaning of the phrase at issue." Id. at 1043.
Similarly, in Quaker State Oil Refining Corp. v. Burmah-Castrol, Inc., 504 F.
Supp. 178, 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), the court found "false on its face" the statement
that: "An independent lab test reveals that . .. Castrol does not lose viscosity"
because, even though the study showed it did not permanently lose viscosity, it did
so temporarily, and the ad "may be fairly read to mean that Castrol never loses
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may also consider the context in which claims are made to ascertain
12 6
their message.
After determining what message is conveyed by a challenged
advertisement, the court must then decide whether that message is
false or misleading. The definition of a "false" claim would seem to
be self-evident. The Lanham Act, however, does not allow an advertiser to mislead consumers with half-truths. Therefore, even if an
advertisement is literally true, the plaintiff may still prevail by show27
ing that consumers received a false impression about the product.
Courts often require survey data to determine whether an advertis28
ing claim leaves a false impression in its wake.'
viscosity even temporarily .. " See also Upjohn Co. v. Riahom Corp., 641 F. Supp.
1209, 1223 (D. Del. 1986) (court decided what "patented" would likely mean to
American consumer, and concluded that its "clear implication" was false); Tambrands, Inc. v. Warner-Lambert Co., 673 F. Supp. 1190, 1193 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
(court found that the "thrust of defendants' advertisements is false" and hence the
advertisements were "false on their face").
Of course, the court must be fairly convinced that a technical definition comports with its common meaning. In Energy Four, Inc. v. Dornier Medical Systems,
Inc., 765 F. Supp. 724, 729 (N.D. Ga. 1991), the defendant claimed, in comparative
advertising, that the plaintiff's product was subject to "catastrophic failure." The
plaintiff produced evidence, by a principal and an expert, indicating that "catastrophic failure was generally understood in the relevant medical community to
mean a failure resulting in serious equipment damage or patient injury." The defendant, by contrast, relied on the definition of "catastrophic failure" found in an
engineering dictionary ("a sudden failure without warning, as opposed to degradation failure"). The court rejected the dictionary definition, noting that the defendant had "presented no evidence that the dictionary definition reflected a common
understanding among targeted consumers." Id. at 729-30.
126 The court may consider the necessary implications of the literal words. For
example, in Tambrands, 673 F. Supp. at 1193-94, the court found that the
"[d]efendants' advertisements are facially false in that they state by necessary implication that New E.P.T. Plus is a ten-minute test, when in fact the test requires at least
thirty minutes for most women to obtain test results." Id. (The court further found
that "material statements in the ad are facially false ... by necessary implication"
even though the ad "does not make the [facially false] statements in haec verba")
(emphasis added). The court held that "the thrust of defendants' advertisements is
false, and that even the qualifying words added to the advertising copy do not sufficiently modify the message to render the advertisements true." Id. at 1193 (emphasis added).
127 Energy Four, Inc., 765 F. Supp. at 730.
128 When the court can simply look at the claim and find that it is false on its face,
there is no need to determine how the message has been or will be understood in
the marketplace. See Coca-Cola v. Tropicana Products, Inc., 690 F.2d 312, 317 (2d
Cir. 1982) ("When a merchandising statement or representation is literally or explicitly false, the court may grant relief without reference to the advertisement's
impact on the buying public.") (citations omitted); Energy Four, Inc., 765 F. Supp. at
731 ("When representations are actually false, a court does not have to determine
whether the representations are likely to create confusion.") (citing Sandoz
Pharmaceuticals Corp. v. Richardson-Vicks, Inc., 902 F.2d 222 (3d Cir. 1990)).
By contrast, if the advertising claim is literally true, and there is a legitimate
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Most disputes over comparative scientific establishment claims
boil down to one dispositive issue: is the claim false on its face?
The remaining elements of a Lanham Act claim may rarely be contested. A multi-million dollar comparative advertising campaign,
based on a literally false scientific claim, will unquestionably influence purchasing decisions; 2 1 the false claim will "travel[] in interstate commerce;" 3 ' and the false claim will certainly cause
competitive injury."'
dispute about the ultimate meaning of the message, most courts require survey
evidence to determine whether a substantial number of consumers will be misled.
See Tyco Indus. v. Lego Systems, 5 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1023, 1030 (D.N.J. 1987) ("[W]here
as here the issue is whether true statements are misleading or deceptive despite
their truthfulness, it is not enough to place statements alone before the Court. The
plaintiff must adduce evidence (usually in the form of market research or consumer
surveys) showing how the statements are perceived by those who are exposed to
them.") (quoting McNeilab Inc. v. American Home Products Corp., 501 F. Supp.
517, 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)); cf.Stiffel Co. v. Westwood Lighting Group, 658 F. Supp.
1103, 1112 (D.N.J. 1987) (survey evidence is critical because, if an advertisement is
not false on its face, whether it is misleading "must be resolved by reference to
representative reactions of the trade and consuming public"); Quaker State, 504 F.
Supp. at 182 (surveys essential "[i]f an advertisement is not facially false" (quoting
American Home Prod. Corp. v. Johnson &Johnson Corp., 577 F.2d 160, 165 (2d
Cir. 1978)).
129 Ordinarily, consumer reaction surveys are necessary to "supply evidence that
the abusive advertisement was the cause of the plaintiff's potential lost sales or
goodwill, thus indicating a likelihood of injury." Pompeo, supra note 102, at 575
(citing Coca-Cola, 690 F.2d at 317); see also Vidal Sassoon v. Bristol-Myers Co., 661
F.2d 272, 276-79 (2d Cir. 1981) ("where depictions of consumer test results or
methodology are... significantly misleading.., proof of diversion of sales is not
required for an injunction to issue"); American Home Prod., 577 F.2d at 167-69 (district court properly relied on survey results in deciding product superiority claim).
When an advertising claim is literally false, however, most courts will presume
its materiality. See Alpo Petfoods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 720 F. Supp. 194, 214
(D.D.C. 1989) ("Since this court has found that Ralston's CHD claims are actually
false, their materiality thus may be presumed."); Energy Four, Inc., 765 F. Supp. at
731 ("actually false claims are presumed material") (citing PPX Enterprises v. Audiofidelity Enterprises, 818 F.2d 266, 272 (2d Cir. 1987)). In these instances,
"[r]elief can be granted without reference to the reaction of consumers." Id. at 731.
The same is true when courts deal with comparative advertising, since, by definition, the advertisement specifically targets the plaintiff's trademark. See Energy Four,
Inc., 765 F. Supp. at 734 ("When an advertisement makes a misleading comparison
to a specifically identified competing product, the value of the competing product is
necessarily diminished in the mind of the consumer and irreparable injury may be
presumed.").
130 U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Philadelphia, 898 F.2d 914, 922
(3d Cir. 1990). See, e.g., Energy Four, Inc., 765 F. Supp. at 730 n.l ("Neither party
disputes that the allegedly false and misleading representations were made in the
realm of interstate commerce.").
131 U.S. Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 922-23.
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Injunctive Relief: The Mainstay

Once a plaintiff shows that a comparative scientific establishment claim is false, some form of injunctive relief should be available. Of course, a plaintiff must first demonstrate that it may
suffer irreparable injury if the erroneous or misleading advertisement is allowed to persist.' 32 With a false comparative scientific
establishment claim, however, irreparable injury will be presumed 13 3 because "[a] misleading comparison to a specific competing product necessarily diminishes that product's value in the
134
minds of the consumer."
132 To recover damages under the Lanham Act, the plaintiff must show that it has
actually lost sales as.a result of the offending advertisement. But to obtain injunctive relief, the plaintiff need only show the likelihood of that eventuality. See CocaCola, 690 F.2d at 316; Upjohn Co. v. Riahom Corp., 641 F. Supp. 1209, 1225 (D.
Del. 1986); Skil v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 375 F. Supp. 777, 783 (N.D. Ill. 1974) ("In
order to recover damages under section 43(a) [of the Lanham Act], plaintiff must
establish that the buying public was actually deceived; in order to obtain equitable
relief,only a likelihood of deception need be shown.") (citations omitted) (emphasis
in original). This is not to say that injunctive relief may be granted on speculation
that a competitor's false advertisement could affect sales. Thus, courts have emphasized that, while lost sales need not be shown to obtain equitable relief, a mere
subjective belief of injury is insufficient. Coca-Cola, 690 F.2d at 316.
133 See McNeilab, Inc. v. American Home Products Corp., 848 F.2d 34, 38 (2d
Cir. 1988) (when a case involves a false comparative advertising claim, the trial
court may presume irreparable injury "from a finding of false or misleading advertising"). Compare Coca-Cola, 690 F.2d at 316 (holding that the likelihood of injury
and causation will not be presumed because the case did not involve false or misleading comparative advertising).
134 McNeilab, 848 F.2d at 38. The court reasoned: "A misleading comparison to a
specific competing product necessarily diminishes that product's value in the minds
of the consumer. By falsely implying that Advil is as safe as Tylenol in all respects,
AHP deprived McNeil of a legitimate competitive advantage and reduced consumers' incentive to select Tylenol rather than Advil .... In that context ...irreparable
harm will be presumed." Id. (citations omitted). Another court recently put the
proposition in these terms:
The expenditure by a competitor of substantial funds in an effort
to deceive consumers and influence their purchasing decisions justifies the existence of a presumption that consumers are, in fact, being
deceived. He who has attempted to deceive should not complain
when required to bear the burden of rebutting a presumption that he
has succeeded.
Hobart Corp. v. Welbilt Corp., 1989 U.S. Dist. LExIs 14447, at *31 (E.D. Ohio Oct.
4, 1989) (citing U-Haul Int'l, Inc. v. Jartan, Inc., 793 F.2d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir.
1986)); accord Energy Four, 765 F. Supp. at 734 ("Given the intense and direct competition between the parties, it is clear that the court may presume that any false or
misleading statements made by either party will injure the other."); E.R. Squibb &
Sons, Inc. v. Stuart Pharmaceuticals, No. 90-1178, 1990 WL 159909, at * 18 (D.N.J.
1990) ("Irreparable harm is apparent in a multi-million dollar promotional campaign such as this between major pharmaceutical companies."); McNeil-P.P.C., Inc.
v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 755 F. Supp. 1206, 1210 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) ("Irreparable harm is generally presumed for Lanham Act violations because a false compari-
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A trial court has broad discretion in framing the scope of the
relief. In some cases, it may not be enough for the defendant to
simply stop its advertising campaign. Rather, it may be necessary
to require the defendant to take affirmative actions to minimize
Affirmative steps may
or eliminate any consumer confusion. 3
be warranted because the message from a false claim "remains in
the public mind and can influence consumer decisions long after
the newspaper is consigned to the trash bin."' 3 6 Moreover, a
son to a specific product reduces the consumers' incentive to purchase that
product.") aff'd., 938 F.2d 1544 (2d Cir. 1991).
'35 Upjohn, 641 F. Supp. at 1226 (citations omitted).
136 U-Haul Int'l, 601 F. Supp. at 1144. In Linotype Co. v. Varityper, Inc., No. 89
CIV. 4747, 1989 WL 94338 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 1989), for example, the court ordered corrective advertising. The court reasoned:
The relief ordered should be oriented toward eliminating the
false nature of the offending advertisement, as well as the confusion it
engenders in the minds of consumers. Corrective advertising may be
ordered where appropriate.
We believe that an adequate remedy here requires both an end to
the circulation of the offending advertisement, and some form of corrective advertising.
[I]n order to counteract the false impression that may have been
placed by the ad in consumer's minds, Varityper shall publish a corrective advertisement. The corrective ad is to be placed, as soon as
possible, in the same publications in which the offending ad appeared,
for the same number of consecutive issues, and in the same size and
frequency as that of the offending ad.
Id. at *3 (citations omitted). Accord Ames Publishing Co. v. Walker-Davis Publications, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 1, 15-16 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (ordering that the defendants
"cause to be published and issued at their expense [a corrective notice] ... to each
person.., to whom or which defendants have previously given... all or any part of
defendants' [false advertising materials]"); cf. Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Worldwide Entertainment Corp., 195 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 539, 543 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (district
court "has the power to order cure of publications"); Metro Mobile CTS, Inc. v.
NewVector Communications, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 1289, 1296 (D. Ariz. 1986) (recognizing the authority "to have the court order [the defendant] to run corrective advertisements to cure the taint of its false or misleading advertisements"), rev'd, 803
F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1986)(unreported), on remand, 661 F. Supp. 1504 (D. Ariz.
1987), aff'd, 892 F.2d 62 (9th Cir. 1989); Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d
749, 761-62 (D.D.C. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 950 (1978) (after a false advertisement ceases, the message of the advertisement lives on and continues to harm the
competition as well as the consuming public, which should not be misled to buy
products on the basis of the false advertising).
For these reasons, many commentators have endorsed corrective advertising.
See Pompeo, supra note 129, at 565 ("One injury is the lingering or residual effect
that the message has on the consumer ....
Furthermore, subsequent truthful ads
which are not corrective in nature may serve to reinforce the deception by stimulating the false perception through continued exposure to the product or service.")
(citations omitted); Note, "Corrective Advertising ".Orders of the FederalTrade Commission,
85 HARV. L. REv. 477, 493-94 (1971) (corrective advertising counteracts the lingering effects of false advertisements).
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simple injunction prohibiting further false claims may not serve
to adequately deter false advertising. 37 Appropriate affirmative
steps may include a recall of the offending advertisements,'
an order prohibiting the defendant from filling orders obtained
on the basis of the false claim,' 39 and mandatory corrective
advertising. 140
In determining whether injunctive relief is appropriate, as
well as the form it may take, courts have historically considered
137 One court has persuasively observed, albeit in the context of an FTC enforcement action, that the mere prohibition of further false advertising is not enough to
discourage false claims in the first instance:
[Flor an advertiser who knowingly advertises falsely a simple
cease and desist order provides no real deterrent. He has nothing to
lose but attorneys' fees. He gets to use the deceptive advertisements
until he is caught ....
By the time the order has become final, the
particular campaign has probably been squeezed dry, if not already
discarded. In the meantime the seller has increased his market share
and reaped handsome profits. The order to cease making the false
claims takes none of this away from him. In short, "[a] cease and desist order which commands the respondent only to 'go, and sin no
more' simply allows every violator a free bite at the apple."
Warner-Lambert, 562 F.2d at 761-62 n.60 (citation omitted).
138 See, e.g., Upjohn Co., 641 F. Supp. at 1226-27 (on a preliminary injunction application, defendants ordered to, among other things, recall offending promotional
materials, cancel pending orders for products, and "send a written notice to each of
the customers . . . notifying them that the orders have been canceled because defendants are unable to supply the product.").
139 See, e.g., CB Sports Inc. v. Gaechter-Haber & Assoc., 210 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 597,
604 (D. Vt. 1981) (preliminary injunction directing party not to fill orders emanating from a false advertisement); Playskool, Inc. v. Product Development Group,
Inc., 699 F. Supp. 1056, 1063 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (preliminary injunction requiring
defendants "to recall all of their product already sold and distributed which contains the [offensive] language"); Tree Tavern Products, Inc. v. Conagra, Inc., 640 F.
Supp. 1263, 1273 (D. Del. 1986) (preliminary injunction requiring defendant "to
recall and remove from distribution" offending articles).
140 Avis Rent a Car System, Inc. v. The Hertz Corp., 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 95, 96
(E.D.N.Y 1985) (defendant ordered to publish corrective advertisements in same
publications that carried the offensive advertisement; defendant required to state
that its earlier ad was not true, that it was compelled to print retractions by court
order, and that it was compelled to do so at its own expense), rev'd on other grounds,
782 F.2d 381 (2d Cir. 1986); Ames Publishing, 372 F. Supp. at 16 (defendant ordered
to distribute a direct mailing of corrective information); cf. CB Fleet Co. v. Complete Packaging Corp., 739 F. Supp. 393, 399 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (preliminary injunction requiring defendants to "notify each person or entity to which they have
already sold any of the goods in question... and immediately recall those goods
from the purchasers .. "); Maybelline Co. v. Noxell Corp., 643 F. Supp. 294, 29798 (E.D. Ark. 1986) (preliminary injunction requiring defendant to cease sale of
offending product, "to send a letter to all to whom [the product] has been distributed directing them to withhold further sales ... at this time," and to "advise the
Court and opposing counsel [of] the steps which have been effectuated to carry out
the terms of this provision .... ), rev'd on othergrounds, 813 F.2d 901 (8th Cir. 1987).
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the public interest. A Lanham Act case challenging a false scientific establishment claim unquestionably involves the public welfare. This is particularly the case when the false advertising claim
like a false safety or efficacy claim concerning a medication jeopardizes
the safety or well-being of consumers who may rely
41
on it.'
IV.

SCIENTIFIC ESTABLISHMENT CLAIMS UNDER
THE LANHAM ACT

A.

The Lanham Act Establishment Claim

The concept of an "establishment claim" first entered Lanham Act jurisprudence in 1986 with Thompson Medical Co. v. CibaGeigy. 142 The court defined an establishment claim as one that
"represents that there is scientific evidence which establishes the
truth of the statement."'' 43 To be sure, there were some intellectual precursors of that development. Courts had previously held,
for example, that the Lanham Act prohibits not only false statements about products, but also false statements about the scientific
144
data underlying product claims.'
Courts have not, however, entirely embraced the FTC's jurisprudence governing scientific establishment claims. Courts
have, for example, split on whether "prior substantiation" of the
claim is required under section 43(a). At least one court has held
that an advertising claim, made without pre-existing data to support the claim, is a false claim within the meaning of section
43(a).' 4 5 Most courts, on the other hand, have held that a plaintiff must prove that the claim itself is false and may not prevail by
simply showing that the defendant cannot substantiate its
141 See, e.g., Energy Four, Inc. v. Dornier Medical Systems, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 724,

736 (N.D. Ga. 1991) (court orders both parties to engage in massive corrective
advertising campaigns to correct false statements implicating safety and efficacy of
medical devices); E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Stuart Pharmaceuticals, No. 90-1178,
1990 WL 159909, at *18 (D.N.J. Oct. 16, 1990) ("The public interest favors the

issuance of an injunction when the health of a large percentage of the population is
at stake.").
142 643 F. Supp. 1190 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). This was a Lanham Act case involving
issues similar to those in a concurrent FTC action, Thompson Medical Co. v. FTC,
791 F.2d 189 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1086 (1987). In Ciba-Geigy, the
court applied the "establishment claim" concept developed under the FTCA.
143 Ciba-Geigy, 643 F. Supp. at 1196.
144 See Vidal Sassoon, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Co., 661 F.2d 272, 277 (2d Cir. 1981)
(Lanham Act embraces misrepresentations regarding the methods and results of
tests).
145 Johnson &Johnson v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 484 F. Supp. 975, 991-92 (D.N.J.
1979).
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claim. 1
The distinction is an important one and was dispositive in
Energy Four, Inc. v. Dornier Medical Systems, Inc. 147 In that case,
Dornier Medical Systems (Dornier) challenged Energy Four's
performance claims concerning a competing medical device.
Dornier showed that Energy Four did not have sufficient evidence to establish the truth of its claims, but the court concluded
that Dornier could not prevail on that showing alone. The court
held: "Energy Four's claims regarding [product performance]
may not have been fully substantiated ... but Dornier failed to
show that these claims were actually false. . . . [Likewise] Energy
Four did not carry its burden of showing [Dornier's] claims sub148
stantially likely to be proven false."'
The "prior substantiation" question arises only in the context of non-establishment claims (i.e., when the advertiser makes an
objective representation about its product but does not expressly
represent that it has been proven or that any particular evidence
supports the representation). In these instances, the plaintiff
must do more than show that the defendant lacks the evidence to
support its claim. Rather, the plaintiff must actually prove that
the claim is false.1 49 With an establishment claim, the advertiser
asserts not only that its product claim is true, but also that it has
the scientific evidence to prove it. If either proposition is false
(i.e., the product is not superior or the advertiser does not have
the evidence to prove its claim), the advertisement is false.
FTCA and Lanham Act jurisprudence coincide on the critical
importance of substantiation in their treatment of establishment
claims. The existence of substantiation assumes a talismanic role
because establishment claims can be measured against a single
criterion: whether the advertiser actually has the claimed substantiation. Plaintiffs challenging establishment claims in a section 43(a) action should prevail on the merits if they can simply
show that the advertiser's substantiation, if any, falls short of its
50
claim. 1
146 See, e.g., U-Haul Int'l v.Jartran, Inc., 522 F. Supp. 1238, 1249 (D. Ariz. 1981)
(plaintiff must show that significant numbers of the buying public are deceived).
147 765 F. Supp. 724 (N.D. Ga. 1991).
148 Id. at 733.
149 Id. at 732 (citing Procter & Gamble Co.v. Chesebrough-Ponds, Inc., 747 F.2d
114, 119 (7th Cir. 1984)).
150 See Energy Four, 765 F. Supp. at 731-32.
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Truth Requires Good Science, Not Good Faith

An establishment claim is either true or false. The advertiser
either has the claimed substantiation or it does not. In some
cases, however, the courts have declined to address the scientific
issues and have instead focused on questions of intent or good
faith.' 5 ' This reluctance to decide the scientific issues may be understandable because those issues often lie beyond a court's expertise. But the task is required by the Lanham Act and is
essential to serve its public policy objectives.
In Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Chesebrough-Pond'sInc. ,152 the Second Circuit correctly addressed the court's role in evaluating scientific evidence underlying product superiority claims. In that
case, two leading manufacturers of hand and body lotions challenged each other's comparative advertising. Proctor & Gamble
(P&G) claimed not only that its lotion was "better" than the lotion marketed by Chesebrough-Pond's Inc. (Chesebrough), but
that dermatologists had proven it in clinical tests.' 5 3 Chesebrough asserted that its lotion was as effective as any leading
brand. 54 Both parties sought preliminary injunctive relief.
In extensive hearings, Chesebrough argued that P&G's tests
reflected highly questionable data manipulated to reach a desired
conclusion. Conversely, P&G attacked Chesebrough's studies as
151 These courts may be satisfied, for example, by evidence of scientific tests, apparently conducted in good faith, that arguably support the advertising claim. Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corp. v. Richardson-Vicks, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 597 (D. Del.
1989), aff'd, 902 F.2d 222, 228 n.7 (3d Cir. 1990), is a good example. In that case,
Richardson-Vicks (Vicks) asserted that its cough syrup medication, Pediatric 44,
was superior to the cough medicine marketed by Sandoz Pharmaceuticals (Sandoz)
because Pediatric 44 starts to work the instant it is swallowed. Sandoz claimed that
"the representations about the instant action of the product are false" (i.e., not
scientifically true") within the meaning of the Lanham Act. Sandoz, 902 F.2d at
223.
The district court found that Vicks performed "various tests" to support its
claim and recognized that the truth of the claim depended on those tests. See Richard-Vicks, 735 F. Supp. at 600 ("Vicks' claim . . . depends for its truthfulness on
Vicks' assertions regarding the effectiveness of Pediatric 44's demulcents and the
thickness of its inert syrup."). Rather than determine the "truthfulness" of Vicks's
claim, based on the scientific evidence, however, the district court was instead content to find that Vicks's claim "could" be true. As the Third Circuit noted, the
district court "first found that Vicks's consumer advertising claims were not literally
false, because Vicks's test results indicated that the demulcents in Pediatric 44 could
begin to work immediately." Sandoz, 902 F.2d at 225 (emphasis added).
152 747 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1984).
153 Id. at 116.
154 Id.
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too narrow in scope, poorly designed, sloppily executed, and improperly analyzed.
The district court noted that each party's tests suffered from
serious flaws. The judge concluded that he could not determine
the veracity of either company's claim and, therefore, denied any
preliminary injunctive relief to either party.' 55 In the course of
his opinion, the judge suggested that the outcome of these controversies should turn on questions of the parties' good faith.' 5 6
In addition, the judge suggested that disputes of this nature did
not really belong in the federal courts.
The Second Circuit devoted the better part of its opinion to
clarifying the law on these two points. The court emphasized
that, while proof of bad faith is not required, proof of good faith
would not immunize a defendant. 5 7 The circuit court also emphasized that a trial court must actually decide the scientific
issues:
Although the task of evaluating scientific product tests may be
challenging and distasteful because of the technical and theoretical nature of the procedures involved and the intricate statistical analysis needed to derive qualitative inferences and
conclusions from the data, the court is under just as much of a
duty to consider and weigh such evidence as it is to analyze
economic or scientific evidence in a complicated patent or antitrust case. That a district court, sitting as trier of the facts,
must consider, analyze and weigh expert testimony regarding
clinical testing standards, procedures and results, has long
been recognized.' 5 8
The Second Circuit noted that, while a party's bad faith could
support an inference of bad science, a party's good faith does not
mean that it has necessarily produced good science. Consequently,
proof of good faith would not validate poor product tests or immunize a manufacturer from false advertising claims.' 59 Thus, Chesebrough could have prevailed simply by showing that P&G did not
have the evidence that it claimed to have to establish the superiority
of its lotion. As the Second Circuit noted:
Chesebrough could obtain an injunction against P&G ... by
155

Id. at 118.

See id. at 119 (noting that the district court found the challenged claims to be
"not obviouslyfalse," and based on tests conducted in "apparentgoodfaith") (emphasis
in original).
156

157

Id. at 119.

158

Id. at 120 (citations omitted).
Id.

159
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establishing that the latter's advertising claim of test-proven
superiority was false. To prove such falsity Chesebrough assumed the burden of showing that the tests referred to by P&G
were not sufficiently reliable to permit one to conclude with reasonable
certainty
that they established the proposition for which they were
60
cited. 1
In sum, when an advertiser asserts that a scientific test establishes its claim, courts must decide whether the scientific test actually establishes the claim. To resolve that question, courts must, in
the final analysis, focus on the scientific evidence, not the advertiser's state of mind.
C.

Common Fact Patterns

In cases involving scientific establishment claims, there are a
few recurring fact patterns. The cases run the gamut from establishment claims with no scientific substantiation to claims supported by arguably good science - science conducted (and
portrayed) in accordance with good scientific practices. The latter present the most difficult challenges to resolve.
1. No Real Science
The easiest case to resolve is one in which the defendant has
made establishment claims with no real scientific evidence to support them. In Thompson Medical Co. v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. ,61 Thompson Medical Company (Thompson) claimed that studies
demonstrated the superiority of Dexatrim over other weight-loss
medications. After reviewing the studies cited by Thompson to
support its establishment claim, the court found them fatally
flawed and concluded that no credible study supported Thompson's claim. The court enjoined further advertising until the
claim could be substantiated with valid clinical evidence.
Similarly, in Upjohn Co. v. Riahom Corp.,162 Riahom claimed
that the safety of its product had been clinically proven. In fact,
the evidence showed that Riahom had performed minimal safety
testing, far less than the FDA or any reasonable scientist would
require. The court went so far as to charge the defendants' with
"thumbing their noses at United States drug regulations."' 1 63
The court wrote:
160
161
162
163

Id. (emphasis added).
643 F. Supp. 1190 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
641 F. Supp. 1209 (D. Del. 1986).

Id. at 1225.
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American consumers who see a product claiming that clinical
tests have shown it safe for use expect that the product has
gone through extensive and rigorous testing by the manufacturer, the government or both before its general sale.
[Riahom's] minimal testing of [the product] hardly meets
these expectations. A consumer's decision to buy [the product] might be affected if he or she knew that the safety tests
involved only 59 subjects. .

.

. The Court concludes that

[Riahom's] claim that clinical tests have shown the safety of
[the product] is a deceptive statement covered by the Lanham
Act. 164
Ciba-Geigy and Upjohn were easy cases to resolve because the advertisers had no credible scientific evidence to support their claims.
Another relatively easy type of false claim to identify entails the
clear abuse of good science.
2.

The Abuse of Good Science

Sometimes an advertiser will intentionally distort the findings of a valid study. In P. LorillardCo. v. FTC, 6 5 Reader's Digest
magazine had commissioned an independent laboratory study to
compare the tar and nicotine content of competing cigarettes.
The magazine reported that the results of its independent study
showed no significant difference between the competing
brands.' 6 6 A table listing the results, designed to demonstrate
practically no difference between the brands, showed that "Old
Gold" manufactured by P. Lorillard Co. (Lorillard) enjoyed an
insignificant advantage. 167
Despite the express finding of the laboratory tests, and the
entire thrust of the article, Lorillard proceeded to exploit them in
its advertising. It claimed that the Reader's Digest experiments
had found that Old Gold cigarettes contained the lowest amounts
of nicotine, irritating tars and resins, as though a substantial difference had-been found. In short, Lorillard acted as if it had "re164
165

Id. at 1224.

186 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1950).

Id. at 57. The article concluded that the smoker "need no longer worry as to
which cigarette can most effectively nail down his coffin. For one nail is just about
as good as another." Id.
167 Id. As the court noted, "[t]he table referred to in the article was inserted for
the express purpose of showing the insignificance of the difference in the nicotine
and tar content of the smoke from the various brands of cigarettes. It appears
therefrom that the Old Gold cigarettes examined in the test contained less nicotine,
tars and resins than the others examined, although the difference ... was so small
as to be entirely insignificant and utterly without meaning so far as effect upon the
smoker is concerned." Id.
166
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ceived a citation for public service instead of a castigation from
' 68
the Reader's Digest."'
In response to the FTC's complaint, Lorillard argued that it
was truthfully relating an actual finding reported in the Reader's
Digest article. The court rejected Lorillard's argument, reasoning that an advertiser could not cause the reader to believe the
exact opposite of the author's intended conclusion. The court
wrote:
The fault with this advertising was not that it did not print all
that the Reader's Digest article said, but that it printed a small
part thereof in such a way as to create an entirely false and
misleading impression, not only as to what was said in the article, but also as to the quality of the company's cigarettes....
To tell less than the whole truth is a well known method
of deception; and he who deceives by resorting to such
method cannot excuse the deception by relying upon the
truthfulness per se of the partial truth by which it has been
accomplished. 6'9
Thus, in Lorillard, the advertiser distorted good science. Courts
should have little difficulty in detecting and interdicting this type of
false establishment claim.
3.

Obsolete Scientific Literature

Sometimes an advertiser may rely on obsolete scientific literature to support a claim. Even if that literature by its own terms
supports the advertiser's claim, that claim may be challenged
under the Lanham Act. If the gist of the advertisement is not true
in light of recent scientific evidence, the advertiser should not be
permitted to exploit outdated information to garner an unfair
competitive advantage.

In E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Stuart Pharmaceuticals,'7 ° Stuart
Pharmaceuticals (Stuart) claimed that its blood pressure medication was safer than a competing medication sold by E.R. Squibb
& Sons, Inc. (Squibb). Specifically, Stuart suggested that patients
taking its drug would experience fewer rashes and taste disturbances. To support those claims, Stuart cited to statements in

the current Physicians Desk Reference (PDR).
The court found that Stuart's citation to the PDR could not
"establish" its comparative safety claims for two reasons. First,
168
169
170

Id. at 57.

Id. at 58.
No. 90-1178, 1990 WL 159909 (D.N.J. Oct. 16, 1990).
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the PDR itself relied on outdated scientific literature. Even
though Stuart did not misrepresent the PDR information, the
claims were false because the PDR itself relied on outdated scientific literature.'17 Consequently, Stuart could not hide behind
the PDR's inaccuracy. 72 Second, the court found that Stuart had
unfairly disregarded more current scientific information, including Stuart's own studies suggesting that its product posed a
greater risk of serious side effects.'17
Because scientific knowledge is constantly evolving, today's

"truth" depends on today's scientific information. Just as lawyers
may not rely on overruled authorities to support a legal position,
an advertiser may not rely on outdated scientific studies to sup-

port an advertising claim. If an advertiser attempts to do so, a
court should find that its establishment claim is false within the
meaning of the Lanham Act.
4.

Totally Unreliable Science

In some instances, an advertiser may conduct tests and accurately report their results. The tests may have been performed so
badly, however, as to be totally invalid. In these instances, the

tests cannot establish the advertising claims.
In Alpo Petfoods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co. ,'74 Ralston Purina
171 As the court noted, "both parties' experts agree[d] that the claims that
Squibb's product caused rashes and taste disturbances were outdated." Id. at * 14.
172 The court held:
Both sides agree that the comparison about rash and taste disturbance is outdated.... As noted in court by counsel for Squibb, Stuart
had in its possession an article written by doctors for [Stuart] which
stated that, "although early clinical experience with [these medications] indicate a troublesome side effect profile, it is now recognized
that used appropriately they are generally well tolerated." [Stuart]
chose to hide behind the PDR. The court finds this unsatisfactory.
Id. at *18.
173 To support its efficacy claims, Stuart cited a study that it had commissioned.
But Stuart chose to ignore unfavorable data from that study when it proceeded to
make its comparative safety claims:
[T]he court considers it a material omission to fail to mention the
adverse side effects of [Stuart's medication]. Indeed, the [study]
found that [Stuart's medication] produced a side effect of cough four
times more often than [Squibb's medication] and both drugs produced headache. The revised ad claims that [Stuart's medication] has
a low incidence of side effects. It is false for Stuart to omit the information it had from the [study] about [these] side effects while presenting the negative side effects information about [Squibb's medication].
Id.
174 720 F. Supp. 194, 202 (D.D.C. 1989), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds,
913 F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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Company (Ralston) claimed that its dog food reduced or eliminated canine hip dysplasia (CHD) based on its in-house scientific
research. Alpo Petfoods Inc. (Alpo) challenged Ralston's advertising claim. The district court heard weeks of conflicting expert
testimony on the scientific basis for Ralston's CHD-related advertising. The court appropriately defined the standard governing
litigation:
A product claim is false under the Lanham Act if the representation cites tests or other authority that does not substantiate
the claim made; that is if the false substantiation is part of the
representation. A representation purportedly supported by
clinical research may be deemed false if it is shown that the tests
referred to were not sufficiently reliable to permit a reasonable conclusion
1 75
that the research established the claim made.
The court carefully scrutinized the scientific evidence that Ralston cited to support its claim. The court found that Ralston had,
among other things, improperly combined unrelated data to attain
statistical significance, ignored warnings from its researchers concerning the validity of its data, discarded inconsistent results, failed
to properly control variables, failed to properly select test animals,
and failed to establish accurate methods of testing for CHD. Consequently, the court found that Ralston's study was totally invalid and
176
could not establish its claims.
In cases of this sort, like the other types we have previously examined, courts should have little difficulty in determining that the
scientific evidence cited to support an establishment claim does not,
in fact, establish the claim. The most difficult cases, however, are
discussed next. These involve instances in which the advertiser has
'75 Id. at 213 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Accord McNeil-P.P.C., Inc. v.
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 755 F. Supp. 1206, 1211 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) ("A claim of
test proven superiority may be deemed false if it is shown that the clinical research

purportedly supporting the representation was not sufficiently reliable to permit

the reasonable conclusion that the research established the claim made."), aff'd.,
938 F.2d 1544 (2d Cir. 1991).
176 The court wrote:

This court finds that inadequacies in the design and execution of
Ralston's research were so substantial that the data gleaned from the

tests are not valid. This finding is based on the court's evaluation of
the design of the CHD research, the methods used in conducting the

trials, the inability to explain how the anion gap formula affects hip
joint formation, the objectivity and skill of the persons conducting the
tests and their concerns that the research did not adequately support

the claims made by Ralston.
Alpo Pet Foods, 720 F. Supp. at 206.
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good science to support its claim, but the scientific evidence just
may not suffice to establish the claim.
5.

Good Science Short of the Mark

The most difficult cases to resolve are those in which a good
scientific effort produced good science, but the data may not suffice to establish the claim. In American Home Products Corp. v. Abbott Laboratories,177 Abbott Laboratories (Abbott) claimed that, "in
a major consumer preference test," its product was preferred
"more than 2 to 1."17S The court found that Abbott's advertising
correctly reported the results of the study and that the study was
"colorably" valid.' 79 But the court held that American Home
Products Corporation (American) could still prevail if it showed,
by more reliable data, that Abbott's claims were false. The court
wrote:
Evidence of tests that are both methodologically superior and
practical would be highly relevant ....
[A defendant may not]
escape liabilityfor comparativeclaims merely because its test methodology
was sufficiently rigorous to escape a judgment of methodological invalidity as a matter of law. A plaintiff may well meet its burden of
proving a Lanham Act violation by establishing, on the basis of
more reliable
test results, that the claim was in fact false or
80
misleading.'
Thus, a defendant may not prevail by simply showing that its
test is colorably valid and that its advertisement accurately reported
the results. The issue is whether the overall message of superiority
is true. To make that determination, courts must consider the question in light of all the scientific evidence presented.
D.

Evaluating the Science

There is no "bright-line" test to distinguish between good
and bad science, valid and invalid conclusions, and studies that
can and cannot establish a particular claim. Indeed, science itself
recognizes no clear demarcation. The absence of any bright-line
test, however, does not mean that a scientific judgment may be
entirely subjective.
To evaluate claims based on scientific evidence, scientists
consider several criteria. Courts should apply these criteria in
177 522 F. Supp. 1035 (S.D.N.Y.
178

179

Id. at 1037.
Id. at 1038-39.

180 Id. at 1039 (emphasis added).

1981).
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Lanham Act litigation. If an advertiser asserts that a particular
study has established a claim, the courts should consider what
evidence the scientific community would require before concluding that a similar claim has been established.'"'
The FDA follows this approach. Under FDA regulations, the
substantiation must be such that "it can fairly and responsibly be
concluded by [qualified] experts that the drug is safe and effective for [the advertised] uses."' 8 2 Similarly, in evaluating substantiation of drug advertising claims, the FTC also "looks to
what the scientific or medical community would require, as evidenced by such sources as FDA regulations, expert opinion and/
or expert panel reports."' 8l 3 Consequently, the FTC's standards
often coincide with those of the FDA. The FTC has noted that
the FDA's standards for evaluating scientific studies cited in food
and drug advertisements:
[Plarallel well-established principles under the FTC's ad substantiation doctrine. Commission orders often require that
advertisers possess "reliable and competent evidence" to substantiate their representations, and typically define such evi-

dence as those tests, analyses, research, studies, or other
evidence conducted and evaluated in an objective manner by
persons qualified to do so, using procedures generally accepted 84
in the profession to yield accurate and reliable
results.'

In Lanham Act cases, courts have adopted many of the standards used by the FDA and the FTC to evaluate scientific studies.
Although courts should always consider "all relevant circumstances, ' 8 5 several tend to play a pivotal role in these cases.
181 See Removatron Int'l Corp. v. FTC, 884 F.2d 1489, 1498 (1st Cir. 1989) (in
evaluating an establishment claim, the FTC "determines what evidence would in
fact establish such a claim in the relevant scientific community. It then compares
the advertisers' substantiation evidence to that required by the scientific community
to see if the claims have been established.") (citation omitted).
182 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(4)(iii)(b) (1991).
183 Comments Regarding Health Messages, supra note 22, at 15 n.36 (citing In the Matter of Thompson Medical Co., Inc., 104 F.T.C. 648, 825-26 (1984), aff'd, 791 F.2d
189 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1086 (1987)).
184 Comments Regarding Health Messages, supra note 22, at 16-17 (citing In the Matter of Pharmtech Research, Inc., 103 F.T.C. 448, 459 (1984)).
185 Thompson Medical Co. v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 643 F. Supp. 1197 (S.D.N.Y.
1986). The"relevant circumstances" may include "the state of the testing art, the
existence and feasibility of superior procedures, the objectivity and skill of the person conducting the test, the accuracy of their reports, and the results of other pertinent tests." Id. (citing Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Chesebrough-Pond's Inc., 747
F.2d 114, 119 (2d Cir. 1984)).
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Qualified Investigators

A study should be conducted by qualified investigators.
Under FDA regulations, an advertising claim for a prescription
drug must be based on studies conducted by "experts qualified
by scientific training and experience to evaluate the safety and
FTC
effectiveness of the drug involved....",
In addition, the
87
"independent."
be
experts
that
preferred
has generally
Whether an investigator is qualified or sufficiently independent remains a fact-sensitive question. In evaluating expert witnesses, courts consider a variety of factors, including their "realworld" experience,18 their familiarity with the relevant published literature,'8 9 whether they have published in the field,' 90
are members of relevant professional societies,' 9 ' and whether
they consider themselves to be an expert in the field. 1 92 Failure
to satisfy criteria similar to these undermined Ralston's claims in
Alpo Petfoods. ' 93
186
187

21 C.F.R. § 202.1(4)(b)(3)(b) (1991).

For example, the FTC's experts agreed that "a [product's] efficacy should be
tested in clinical trials conducted by independent investigators, for one investigator's commitment to the hypothesis being tested may influence his perceptions of a
study's results." In the Matter of Schering Corp., No. 9232, slip op. at 36 (Initial
Decision, Sept. 16, 1991).
188 See In re Air Crash Disaster At New Orleans, Louisiana, 795 F.2d 1230, 1234
(5th Cir. 1986) ("[T]he professional expert is now commonplace. That a person
spends substantially all of his time consulting with attorneys and testifying is not a
disqualification. But experts whose opinions are available to the highest bidder
have no place testifying in a court of law, before a jury, and with the imprimatur of
the trial judge's decision that he is an 'expert.' "); Hartke v. McKelway, 526 F.
Supp. 97, 101 (D.D.C. 1981) (physician's "reading of literature and conferring with
other physicians on the eve of trial did not qualify her to testify"), aff'd, 707 F.2d
1544 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 983 (1983).
189 Will v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 647 F. Supp. 544, 548 (S.D. Ga. 1986). See
also Thompson v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 229 N.J. Super. 230, 241, 551
A.2d 177, 183 (App. Div. 1988) (witness not qualified because his "expertise" in
the field was "based solely on a few articles he had read in preparation for his
testimony").
190 See Richardson by Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823, 826
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (expert not qualified because he "had neither performed his own
studies nor published his criticisms of the studies performed by others").
191 See Smith v. Hobart Manufacturing Co., 185 F. Supp. 751, 756 (E.D. Pa. 1960)
(expert not qualified in engineering because, among other things, he was not "a
member of at least one organization or society dedicated to the improvement of
that profession").
192 See, e.g., Gates v. United States, 707 F.2d 1141, 1145 (10th Cir. 1983) (witness
not qualified to render an opinion because he admitted that he was not qualified to
render an opinion); Thompson, 229 N.J. Super. at 236, 551 A.2d at 181 (witness
"acknowledged that he was not qualified to render an opinion.
193 The court noted:
The objectivity and skill of those conducting the tests is also a factor
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An Objective Methodology

The scientific method requires objectivity.' 94 Consequently,
the proponent of a study should be prepared to show that generally accepted scientific procedures were used to yield reliable results. 195 In Alpo Petfoods, Ralston's data lacked credibility because

its investigator "used a test method which had not been used or
approved for use by any experts or established research
organizations." 196
An objective methodology in a clinical trial of prescription
drugs also requires a protocol defined in advance of the study.' 97
A protocol insures that, as the test progresses, investigators will
not make ad hoc adjustments to reach a desired outcome. The
protocol should prescribe, in advance, how the test will be conducted and how the data will be analyzed. The latter is essential
to avoid "data dredging" - looking through results without a
predetermined plan until one finds data to support a claim.' 98
FDA regulations codify this principle. Under the regulain the court's determination. Dr. Kealy, who conducted and supervised Ralston's CHD research, spent very little of his professional life
in CHD research. None of the papers authored by Dr. Kealy, with the
exception of Ralston's promotional research monograph, concern
CHD. Only three relate to dogs: two concerning calcium metabolism
and one on the evaluation of a dog's coat of hair. Additionally, Dr.
Kealy, as an employee of Ralston, had a strong interest in seeing that
the research conducted supported the anion gap theory, especially
since a good portion of the research was performed while market
planning for the formula was already underway.
Alpo Petfoods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 720 F. Supp. 144, 207-08 (D.D.C. 1989),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 913 F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1990), modified, 1991 WL 25793
(D.D.C. 1991).
194 See In the Matter of Pharmtech Research, Inc., 103 F.T.C. 448, 459 (1984); In
the Matter of Porter & Dietsch, Inc., 90 F.T.C. 770, 868, 885 (1977), aff'd sub nom.
Porter & Dietsch Inc. v. FTC, 605 F.2d 294 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 950
(1980).
195 Of course, if a published study does not adequately describe its methodology,
the study may not be adequately evaluated. In that instance, it may not provide
much support, if any, to sustain a claim. See In the Matter of Schering Corp., No.
9232, slip op. at 49 (Initial Decision, Sept. 16, 1991) (declining to consider a particular study because "the description of its design, implementation and results is so
brief that one cannot assume its validity and reliability").
196 Alpo Petfoods, 720 F. Supp. at 207.
197 In Schering, the experts agreed that a pre-defined protocol represents one element of a "well-conducted and controlled clinical trial." Shering, No. 9232, slip op.
at 35. Further, "[a] pre-study protocol should be devised which sets forth how the
research is to be implemented and analyzed, including how subjects are to be randomized into treatment groups, and what statistical techniques are to be employed." Id. at 35.
198 See In the Matter of Thompson Medical Co., 104 F.T.C. at 825-28.
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tions, an advertisement may be false if it "[u]ses statistical analyses and techniques on a retrospective basis to discover and cite
findings not soundly supported by the study ..

."'99 Thus, to

satisfy FDA standards, statistical analyses should be defined in
advance of the test. 20 0 Retrospective statistical manipulations
clearly discredited Ralston's claims in Alpo Petfoods.2° 1
20 2 the
In E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Stuart Pharmaceuticals,

court addressed the significance of a scientific protocol:
A protocol is a plan to be carried out to answer the question
posed by the study. It is usually drawn up by the investigator
and the other people who are collaborating in planning the
clinical trial. It is a blueprint or a set of ground rules which
describe the goal of the trial and contains a complete description of the plans for the study.
Adherence to a protocol protects against post-study questions that may arise as to the goals, motives or plans of the
study or allegations that the investigator changed his analysis
in response to various findings in the data.2 °3
To be sure, not every deviation from a protocol will be fatal. In
Squibb, the court found that Stuart actually intended to perform the
study in a particular manner but simply failed to formally revise its
protocol before initiating the study. Hence, the court found that
Stuart's deviations from the original protocol were "insufficient to
establish that the test results were false [and] did not render the
study results illegitimate. "204

On the other hand, intentional deviations from a protocol may
demolish the integrity of a study. In Alpo Petfoods, the court found
that, to reach desired conclusions, Ralston repeatedly deviated from
its protocol.20 5 Moreover, in presenting the conclusions of its laboratory tests, Ralston improperly omitted references to one finding
21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(7)(iii) (1991) (emphasis added).
FDA regulations also provide that an advertising claim is false if the analysis
underlying the claim:
Uses 'statistics' on numbers of patients, or counts of favorable
results or side effects, derived from pooling data from various insignificant or dissimilar studies in a way that suggests either that such
'statistics' are valid if they are not or that they are derived from large
or significant studies supporting favorable conclusions when such is
not the case.
21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(6)(xiv) (1991).
201 Alpo Pet Foods, 720 F. Supp. at 208.
199

200

202

No. 90-1178, 1990 WL 159909 (D.N.J. Oct. 16, 1990).

203
204

Id. at *6.
Id. at * 7.

205

Alpo Petfoods, 720 F. Supp. at 209.
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that totally discredited the basic premise of its scientific theory. 20 6
The court, therefore, appropriately held that Ralston's tests could
not establish its scientific claims.
3.

A Sound Methodology

FDA regulations require that advertising claims for drugs be
supported by "adequate and well-controlled clinical investigations.1 2 °7 FTC decisional law similarly requires "well-conducted
and controlled clinical trials. 20 8 Thus, under FDA regulations,
an advertisement will be considered false or misleading if its
claims are based on a study with inadequate design, scope or
20 9
conduct, such that the study cannot support the claims.
There is no single definition of an "adequate and well-controlled clinical investigation." Several principles, however, are
uniformly recognized. In addition to a pre-defined protocol, a
process known as "double blinding" should be implemented.
With this process, neither the investigator nor the subject knows
whether the latter is receiving the active drug or a placebo.
When any form of "subjective measurement" is made (for example, pain reduction), double blinding is critical because perceptions may be affected by knowledge of a drug's intended
effects.21 0
When a placebo is used, the placebo should have the same
appearance as the active ingredient.
Note, however, that a placebo may not be required in certain direct drug-to-drug comparative studies.2 1 2
Next, a sound methodology utilizes "randomization." With
randomization, it is equally probable that subjects will be asId. at 204.
See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(4)(iii)(b) (1991) (there must be "substantial evidence of safety and effectiveness, consisting of adequate and well-controlled investigations, including clinical investigations").
208 In the Matter of Schering Corp., No. 9232, slip op. at 35 (Initial Decision,
Sept. 16, 1991).
209 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(7)(i) (1991).
210 See Schering, No. 9232, slip op. at 35 ("The product should be tested against a
placebo, which controls for the effect which test subjects often experience simply
because they are being treated. A placebo helps control for the subjective reactions
of the subject and subjective input from the investigator.").
211 Id. at 36.
212 See E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Stuart Pharmaceuticals, No. 90-1178, 1990 WL
159909 (D.N.J. Oct. 16, 1990); see also McNeil-P.P.C., Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb
Co., 755 F. Supp. 1206, 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (describing the "cross-over study" in
which each subject receives one drug, then the other, and effectively serves "as his
own control").
206
207
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control

group.2

3

Randomization is designed to eliminate assignment bias, a prejudice that might occur if the investigators were free to assign particular subjects to particular groups.2 14
4.

Consistency with Independent Data

A reasonable scientist should be less likely to conclude that a
single new study establishes a proposition when the study conflicts with prevailing authority. Courts have recognized that what
may be said to be "scientifically known" resides in "the totality of
the published scientific literature on the subject.., which collectively represents the sum of all that can be said to be scientifically
'known' of the matter at present .... [T]he 'literature' is to scien-

tists both the ultimate authority as2 1 to
and the most respected re5

pository of scientific knowledge.

In Alpo Petfoods, the court, considering the weight of independent scientific authority, noted that the overwhelming
weight of credible scientific authority contradicted Ralston's
claims.216 The court held that representations contradicted by
prevailing authority may be false on their face and actionable
under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.2 17
In this regard, publicly available data should be more credible than solely proprietary data because "the data will be subject
to the review and criticism of the scientific community

. "218

As the FTC has explained: "[B]ecause of the peer review and
criticism that publicly available research will face, such research is
likely to be more rigorously tested and carefully performed than
213

Schering, No. 9232, slip op. at 36.

214 Id.
215 Richardson by Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 799, 802
(D.D.C. 1986), aff'd, 857 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 882 (1989).
216 Alpo Petfoods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 720 F. Supp. 194, 209 (D.D.C.
1989), aff'd in part, 913 F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
217 Id. at 213. See also McNeil-P.P.C., Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 775 F.
Supp. 1206, 1211 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Schering, No. 9232, slip op. at 47 ("Although
analysis of the individual merits or faults of the studies is of paramount importance,
their results must be viewed in light of the fact that, at the time Schering disseminated its Fibre Trim advertising, other evidence suggested that fiber's ability to
cause weight loss was questionable."); id. at 71 ("[R]eputable scientific bodies, both
before and after dissemination of the advertisements, were skeptical about the efficacy of fiber as a weight loss aid. The FDA's 1982 proposal to establish a weight
loss monograph stated that the value of bulk producers like Fibre Trim had not
been established.").
218 Comments Regarding Health Messages, supra note 22, at 23.
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in-house proprietary research. 21 9
If scientific literature conflicts with an advertiser's study, the
advertiser's independent claim may very well be false or misleading. At the very least, however, "it may be necessary for a manufacturer to disclose the existence of contrary
evidence in order to
220
misled.
not
are
consumers
ensure that
5.

The Size or Power of the Study

The size or power of a scientific study is important. The
larger the study, all other things being equal, the more likely it is
that its results will be clinically significant. Under FDA regulations, an advertisement may be false if it "[p]resents information
from a study in a way that implies that the study represents larger
or more general experience with the drug than it actually
does."122 ' Yet, when data are limited, the advertising claim may
still be allowed if the claim is appropriately qualified so that the
advertisement does not imply to consumers that a higher level of
substantiation exists.2 2 2
6.

Replication

In general, the FDA calls for two or more studies to support
a claim.2 23 The FDA's requirement codifies the scientific princi219 Id.; see also Schering, No. 9232, slip op. at 36 ("Peer review and publication in a
reputable scientific journal validates a study's worth."). In many contexts, courts
have recognized the value of peer review. See Ellis v. Int'l Playtex, Inc., 745 F.2d
292, 302 (4th Cir. 1984). See also National Comm'n on Egg Nutrition v. FTC, 570
F.2d 157, 160-61 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978) (administrative
law judge correctly relied on studies that "were conducted using scientific methodologies, were performed by competent and highly regarded investigators, have
been reported in recognized scientific journals after peer review, and have been
generally accepted by experts in the field and by the scientific community"); Perry
v. United States, 755 F.2d at 888, 892 (11 th Cir. 1985) (expert's opinion not credible because, among other reasons, the opinion lacked peer review); Wisconsin v.
Weinberger, 578 F. Supp. 1327, 1345 n.15 (W.D. Wis.), modified, 582 F. Supp. 1489
(W.D. Wis.), rev'd, 745 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1984) (court relied extensively on peerreviewed studies, noting that "[aIrticles published in peer review journals are
screened in advance of publication by other[s] in the same fields"); Kubs v. United
States, 537 F. Supp. 560, 562 (E.D. Wis. 1982) (a scientific study has "little probative value" if it was never "subject to extensive peer review prior to publication");
Zeck v. United States, 559 F. Supp. 1345, 1349 n.3 (D.S.D. 1983) (in a peer-reviewed study, "[tlhe conclusions and methods used to reach the conclusion[s] are
held to exacting scientific standards"), aff'd, 720 F.2d 534 (8th Cir. 1984).
220 Comments RegardingHealth Messages, supra note 22, at 14 n.31 (citation omitted).
221 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(6)(v) (1991).
222 Comments Regarding Health Messages, supra note 22, at 13-14.
223 See 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(4)(iii)(b) (1991) (calling for "adequate and well-con-
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pie of replication, one that has been judicially recognized. 2 24 Ul-

timately, the principle of replication rests on an elementary
principle of logic: if an apparent drug effect reflected in the first
study is real, it will happen again; if it is not real, it will not happen again, and investigators may conclude that the initial findings are not to be taken at face value.
7.

Statistical and Clinical Significance

To support an efficacy claim, a clinical study must show statistically significant results.225 Statistically significant results suggest that the observed differences in effects derive from the
treatment. 226
A finding of statistical significance, however, does not imply
"clinical significance" (i.e., that the perceived difference is relevant to the use of a medication for treatment). In The Matter of
Schering Corp.,227 Schering relied on studies showing a "statistically significant" difference in weight loss due to the use of Fibre
Trim. The ALJ concluded, however, that the results of the study
were not "clinically significant" and, therefore, could not support
Schering's claims.228
trolled investigations"). The FTC has also indicated that "[clonfirmation by independent research is... desirable.". Scering, No. 9232, slip op. at 36.
224 See, e.g., Gulf South Insulation v. United States Consumer Prod. Safety
Comm'n, 701 F.2d 1137, 1146 (5th Cir. 1983) ("it is not good science to rely on a
single experiment"); Wisconsin v. Weinberger, 578 F. Supp. 1327, 1349 (W.D.
Wis.) (expert "noted the need for subsequent independent replication"), modified,
582 F. Supp. 1489 (W.D. Wis.), rev'd on othergrounds, 745 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1984);
Forsham v. Califano, 587 F.2d 1128, 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ("reliability usually accorded to scientific studies [through] replication"), aff'd sub nom. Forsham v. Harris,
445 U.S. 169 (1980); In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 611 F.
Supp. 1267, 1274 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (studies relied on by the plaintiffs experts were
unreliable because "[t]hese ...studies have not been replicated by other investigators"), aff'd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom. Lombardi v. Dow
Chemical Co., 487 U.S. 1234 (1988) (studies relied on by the plaintiffs' experts
were unreliable because "[tihese . . .studies have not been replicated by other
investigators").
225 Cf. 21 C.F.R.
202.1 (e)(6)(xiv) (advertisement false if it erroneously suggests
statistical significance). The conventional test of statistical significance requires a
"p value" equal to or less than .05. This implies a result whose likelihood of occurrence by chance is less than five percent, or five times in one hundred occurrences.
A "p value" greater than .05 is generally not accepted as an indication of an actual
difference between placebo and control group. See Scering, No. 9232, slip op. at 37.
226 Id.
227 Id.
228 The ALJ observed:
[S]tatistical significance alone does not validate a study, for the
question remains: was the observed difference clinically significant or
"clinically trivial." With respect to weight loss studies, some experts
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Claims Based on Consensus and Published Literature

Sometimes an advertisement may expressly assert that a consensus of opinion supports a claim. In these instances, the consensus must exist.2 29 The advertiser should possess the scientific
literature necessary to establish the consensus.
FDA regulations recognize a similar principle. An advertising claim may be false if it "[c]ontains information from published or unpublished reports or opinions falsely or misleadingly
represented or suggested to be ... authoritative. ' 23 0 Moreover,
literary references must reflect current scientific thinking. Thus,
an advertisement will be false if it:
Contains favorable information or opinions about a drug previously regarded as valid but which have been rendered invalid
by contrary and more credible recent information, or contains
literature references or quotations that are significantly more
favorable to the drug than has been demonstrated
by substan23
tial evidence or substantial clinical experience. 1
Recall that Stuart's comparative safety claims in E.R. Squibb & Sons v.
Stuart Pharmaceuticalsfailed for this very reason.2 3 2
This same principle applies to prohibit outdated references to a
recognized authority, such as a medical textbook or treatise. Thus,
FDA regulations prohibit the use of "a statement by a recognized
authority that is apparently favorable about a drug but fails to refer
to concurrent or more recent unfavorable data or statements from
the same authority on the same subject or subjects. 2 3 3
E.

The Role of Substantive Regulatory Standards

Litigants in Lanham Act actions have attempted to use FDA
regulatory standards and specific scientific determinations as
believe that a weight loss product should produce a difference of at
least one-half pound per week between placebo and treatment
groups. Such a weight loss would not only be statistically significant
but clinically significant.
If the results of a study cannot be applied to the actual conditions
under which the tested product will be used they are meaningless.
The [cited] study fails this test and its statistical significance does not,
therefore, prove the value of the recommended dosage of Fibre Trim.
Id. at 54.
229 Comments Regarding Health Messages, supra note 22, at 13.
230 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(7)(xiii) (1991).
231 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(6)(iii) (1991).
232 See supra note 172.
233 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(6)(viii) (1991).
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both a sword and a shield. Over the years, these efforts have generally met with success.
In Grove Fresh Distributors v. Flavor Fresh Foods,234 the court indicated that a party could rely on a competitor's violation of FDA
regulations to establish a Lanham Act claim. The defendants advertised their product as "100% Orange Juice from Concentrate.

' 23 5

In fact, the juice contained additives and adulterants,

including sugar. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants' advertising violated FDA regulations defining "orange juice from concentrate" and the general FD&CA provision prohibiting
misbranding of food.2 3 6
In moving to dismiss, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs could not rely on violations of these provisions because the
FD&CA does not provide for a private cause of action. The court
rejected the defendants' argument and held that a plaintiff could
rely on the violation of an FDA regulation to establish "the standard or duty" in a Lanham Act action.23 7
In Hobart Corp. v. Welbilt Corp.,23 the plaintiff challenged the
defendant's comparative advertising concerning their competing
blenders. The court noted that when an advertisement involves
safety claims, the FTC requires "competent scientific tests. ' ' 239
The court observed that the FTCA, which prohibits "unfair or
deceptive acts 24or
practices," is "analogous to the law under the
0
Lanham Act."

720 F. Supp. 714 (N.D. 111. 1989).
Id. at 715.
Id.
Id. The court reasoned:
The fact that Grove Fresh refers to or relies on an FDA regulation
defining orange juice to support its Lanham Act claim is not grounds
for dismissal. Although courts have held that there is no private cause
of action under the FD&CA, Grove Fresh has not brought suit directly
under the FD&CA or its accompanying regulations. Grove Fresh relies on the FDA regulation merely to establish the standard or duty
which defendants allegedly failed to meet. Nothing prohibits Grove
Fresh from using the FD&CA or its accompanying regulations in that
fashion.
Id. at 716.
238 No. 1:89 CV 1726, 1989 U.S. Dist. LExis 14447 (E.D. Ohio Oct. 4, 1989).
239 Id. at *12 (citing D. Thomson, 72 TRADEMARK REP. 385, at 388-84).
240 Id. at *12. The court found:
Under that law, the Federal Trade Commission has said that it would
consider the facts that a "reasonable prudent advertiser should have
discovered before making the claim. When a medicinal efficacy claim
is made, the standard of prior 'adequate and well-controlled scientific
test[s]' will be applied. When the claim relates to safety, competent
scientific test[s] will be required in advance. Substantially the same
234
235
236
237
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Similarly, the court in Upjohn Co. v. Riahom Corp.24 ' considered FDA standards in weighing the equities on a preliminary injunction application. There, the defendants characterized their
product as a "cosmetic," and not a "drug," without conducting
tests to determine its proper classification under the FD&CA.242
In granting the preliminary injunction, the court found that, by
proceeding without conducting the required tests, the defendants were "thumbing their nose" at FDA regulations.243
In a recent case, the court relied substantially on FDA scientific standards to evaluate the data underlying OTC drug establishment claims. In McNeil-P.P.C.v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. ,244 the
manufacturer of AF Excedrin advertised that "AF Excedrin works
better than ES Tylenol.

' 24 5

The court found that AF Excedrin

contained caffeine whereas ES Tylenol did not. To support its
superiority claim, the defendant relied on studies involving aspirin and caffeine. In challenging the claim, the plaintiff argued
that studies involving aspirin and caffeine were not relevant to
the efficacy of acetaminophen and caffeine. The court agreed,
noting that the FDA's position coincided with the plaintiffs position. 246 The court also rejected other studies involving dosages
outside of the OTC drug range. The court reasoned that FDA
standards required dosages similar to those used by consumers. 24 7 In short, the court declined to credit the defendant's studies because they did not satisfy FDA standards.
Courts have also relied on a defendant's compliance with FDA
standards to reject Lanham Act claims. In American Home Products
Corp. v. Johnson &Johnson,248 McNeilab claimed that AHP's aspirin labeling, prior to 1986, failed to warn that children and teenagers with viral diseases, who took aspirin products, incurred a
significant risk of contracting Reyes Syndrome, a serious and
often fatal condition. AHP defended by arguing that, prior to
standard has been applied to product performance claims that cannot
readily be verified by the consumer."....
That standard provides a
sensible approach. It requires that the advertiser make inquiry before
making claims and that these tests be subject to replication and
verification.
Id.
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248

641 F. Supp. 1209 (D.Del. 1986).
Id. at 1225.
Id.
755 F. Supp. 1206 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
Id. at 1208.
Id. at 1213.
Id.
672 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
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1986, the FDA did not require a warning against this risk and had
actually approved its labeling as adequate. The court thus addressed the question:
whether a competitor has a cause of action under the Lanham
Act based on the failure of an OTC drug manufacturer to include on the packages of its product a warning of a possible
adverse side effect of the drug, where the existence of the side
effect was the subject of scientific dispute and of intensive investigation by the9 FDA, which had found that no such warning
24
was called for.
The court held that AHP's compliance with FDA standards immunized it from liability on this claim under the Lanham Act. The
court first noted: "[i]n unfair competition actions under state statutory or common law, it has been consistently ruled that compliance
with FDA warning requirements is a complete defense.- 2 5 ° The
court observed that the rationale for this defense is "the need for
uniformity in the regulation of advertising and labeling and a deference to the expertise of the responsible regulatory agency." 2 5 ' The
court concluded: "the public interest is presumed to be adequately
represented by the FDA, whose control over OTC drug labeling is
252
pervasive and complete.
...
249
250

Id. at 142.

Id. at 144. In product liability actions, by contrast, courts have declined to
recognize compliance with FDA determinations as a complete defense. See Charles
J. Walsh and Marc S. Klein, The Conflicting Objectives of Federal and State Tort Law Drug
Regulation, 41 FOOD DRUG Cosm. L.J. 171, 185-94 (1986) (discussing cases in which
state courts have imposed tort liability on manufacturers despite their compliance
with FDA requirements).
The divergent standards conflict with public policy:
If drug manufacturers follow state court requirements, they may violate FDA regulations and risk imposition of sanctions, including revocation of their permission to market the drug in question. On the
other hand, manufacturers following the mandate of FDA and disregarding state common law requirements run the risk of substantial
liability. To avoid that risk, manufacturers may decide to withhold
drugs from the market indefinitely while awaiting more definitive test
results. Either way, the public interest will suffer because people with
serious and debilitating illnesses could be required to utilize less beneficial therapies.
Id. at 194.
251 American Home Products, 672 F. Supp. at 144.
252 Id. at 145. While recognizing AHP's compliance with the FDA's standards as a
defense, the court also indicated that AHP's violation of those standards would support McNeil's Lanham Act claim. The court noted that pre-1986 packages of
Anacin, without the Reyes Syndrome warning, remained on store shelves. The
court wrote: "This is unthinkable. All pre-1986 packages should be recalled immediately. If AHP does not do so voluntarily. . . McNeil may move for reinstatement of
the ninth counterclaim nunc pro tunc. AHP should obviously not be permitted to
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The opportunity to further harmonize public and private regulation of scientific establishment- claims in drug advertising, however, suffered a serious blow when the Third Circuit recently
suggested that FDA standards may not play a substantial role in
Lanham Act litigation. In Sandoz PharmaceuticalsCorp. v. RichardsonVicks, Inc. ,253 the controversy centered on whether a Lanham Act
plaintiff "needs to show only that the defendant's advertising claims
of its own drug's effectiveness are inadequately substantiated under
FDA guidelines, or whether the plaintiff must also show that the
claims are literally false or misleading to the public." 2'54
In that case, Richardson-Vicks, Inc. (Vicks) claimed that its testing established the superiority of its cough medicine over a competing product marketed by Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corporation
(Sandoz). Yet, Vicks conceded that its testing would not suffice
under FDA regulations for approval of a new drug. Indeed, the
FDA had not approved Vicks's method of testing as appropriate to
demonstrate the effectiveness of the product.
Sandoz pressed for the adoption of an "inadequate substantiation" standard under the Lanham Act based on the FDA's substantiation requirements. Sandoz correctly noted that the prohibition in
the FTCA against "any false advertising"2'5 5 is indistinguishable
from the Lanham Act's prohibition against "any false description or
'
representation." 256
Therefore, Sandoz argued, it would be absurd
to find that a claim passed muster under the Lanham Act but not
under the FTCA. Vicks countered that, under the Lanham Act, Sandoz still had to prove, through survey evidence, that Vicks's inadequately substantiated claims misled or deceived the consumer.2 5 7
The Third Circuit accepted Vicks's argument, citing a line of
Lanham Act cases requiring explicit proof of consumer deception:
We hold that it is not sufficient for a Lanham Act plaintiff to
show only that the defendant's advertising claims of its own
drug's effectiveness are inadequately substantiated under FDA
guidelines; the plaintiff must also show 2that
the claims are lit58
erally false or misleading to the public.
shield itself behind an FDA order with which it has not made every reasonable effort to comply in spirit as well as in letter." Id. at 146.
253 902 F.2d 222 (3d Cir. 1990).
254
255
256

Id. at 224.
15 U.S.C. § 52(a) (1988).
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988).

257 Sandoz, 902 F.2d at 227. While the case could be read to have involved an
establishment claim, the decision did not characterize the claim as such.
258 Id. at 229. The court cited Procter & Gamble Co. v. Chesebrough-Pond's,
Inc., 747 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1984), for the proposition that, while the FTC could
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The Third Circuit also rejected Sandoz's contention that violation of FTC substantiation requirements should render an advertisement false or misleading per se under the Lanham Act:
[T]he FTC's unique expertise and experience regarding consumer expectations allows it to determine for itself the level of
substantiation consumers expect to support an advertising
claim. If we were to hold that a Lanham Act plaintiff who has
shown that a defendant's advertising claim was not supported
by evidence sufficient to meet FDA testing regulations need
not prove that consumers expect the claim to meet FDA testing requirements, then the Lanham Act plaintiff would stand
in the same position as the FTC. Only the FTC is entitled to
presume consumer expectations, however, because only the
FTC has the necessary administrative experience and
9
expertise.

25

The Third Circuit's meaning in this passage is unclear. The
court did not rely on any textual difference between the standards of
liability under the FTCA and the Lanham Act. Rather, the court
apparently reasoned that, while the FTCA and the FD&CA are
designed to protect consumers, the Lanham Act is primarily
designed to protect competitors.2 6 ° In this analysis, the court ignored both the legislative history and the many authorities recognizing that the Lanham Act is designed to vindicate the public
find a violation of the FTCA based merely on inadequate substantiation, "a Lanham Act plaintiff 'has the burden of proving not only that an advertisement is false,
but also that the ad is misleading.' " Sandoz, 902 F.2d at 228.
259

Id. at 229.

The court wrote:
The Lanham Act is primarily intended to protect commercial interests ....
A competitor in a Lanham Act suit does not act as a 'vicarious avenger' of the public's right to be protected against false
advertising. ... Instead, the statute provides a private remedy to a
commercial plaintiff who meets the burden of proving that its commercial interests have been harmed by a competitor's false
advertising.
Id. at 230.
The Court made a similar point concerning the FD&C Act: "The FD&C Act...
is not focused on the truth or falsity of advertising claims. It requires the FDA to
protect the public interest by 'pass[ing] on the safety and efficacy of all new drugs
and... promulgat[ing] regulations concerning the conditions under which various
categories of OTC drugs . . . are safe, effective and not misbranded.' " Id. at 230
(quoting American Home Prod. v. Johnson & Johnson, 436 F. Supp. 785, 797-98
(S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 577 F.2d 160 (2d Cir. 1978)). The Third Circuit's reasoning
on this score is weak. As we have seen, the FDA has adopted a complete body of
advertising regulations pursuant to its authority under the FD&C Act. These regulations are, by their terms, directly focused "on the truth or falsity of advertising
claims."
260
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interest.261
Likewise, the Third Circuit's argument for deference to regulatory judgments cuts the other way. When the FDA or FTC has
promulgated a specific advertising rule based on its expertise, the
agency has already found that a violation of the rule would mislead
consumers. If courts should defer to administrative expertise, they
should also recognize and apply the rule in Lanham Act litigation.
In terms of pharmaceutical advertising, both the FDA and the
FTC are charged with policing truth in the marketplace. Their mission - to interdict "unfair and deceptive acts or practices" - is
indistinguishable from the ultimate regulatory mission of private litigation under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. Moreover, several
public policy interests are served by coordinating public regulation
of false advertising with private (Lanham Act) regulation of the
same domain.
First, coordination would permit public regulation under the
FTCA or FD&CA and private regulation under the Lanham Act to
send a single, clear and uniform message to advertisers. This
would, in turn, minimize undesirable overbreadth and its undesired
chilling effect with respect to truthful advertising.2 6 2
Second, coordinating the two bodies of regulatory authority
would conserve administrative and judical resources by allowing
them to work in tandem. If the FTC or the FDA takes an aggressive
position, and promptly corrects an abuse in the marketplace, a competitor may be less likely to resort to private litigation. Conversely,
when these administrative agencies fail to take action, perhaps to
261 The Third Circuit's analysis, moreover, is particularly unpersuasive in relation to drug advertising. Drugs are the most heavily regulated products on the
market today. FDA regulations govern, in exquisite detail, drug development, marketing, labeling, and advertising. Physicians and consumers alike may not know the
precise terms of the FDA regulations, but they are surely aware of the FDA's involvement in these areas. Because physicians and consumers would unquestionably
expect drug advertising to comply with FDA regulations, survey data should not be
required to confirm that obvious proposition. A requirement of survey data for that
purpose would vastly complicate and delay a Lanham Act litigation, thus undermining the Act's dual policy objectives: the protection of both aggrieved competitors
and the public welfare. In the context of drug advertising, therefore, courts should
incorporate specific advertising regulations adopted by federal agencies, like the
FDA, if they are designated to prohibit false and misleading claims. Thus, based on
the FDA's substantiation requirement, all scientific representations should be
treated as though they were explicit establishment claims for purposes of Lanham
Act law.
262 See Jeffrey P. Singdahlsen, The Risk of Chill: A Cost of the Standards Governing the
Regulation of False Advertising Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 77 VA. L. REV.
1339 (1991)(vague standards unduly chill the dissemination of useful comparative
advertising).
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conserve their resources, competitors may be willing to bear the litigation costs. In either situation, the result should be the same.
Third, coordination would advance the consumer's welfare as contemplated by both bodies of regulatory law - by clarifying
and standardizing the meaning of scientific establishment claims in
advertising. Physicians and consumers would be assured that all scientific establishment claims meet a single standard, whatever that
standard might be, rather than a patchwork of differing standards.
The differing standards might confuse the important signal of comparative advertising and, hence, detract from its social utility.
Fourth, administrative agencies are better equipped to apply
important scientific principles relevant to evaluating scientific establishment claims in advertising. The agencies have rule making,
technical and scientific expertise, as well as institutional advertising
expertise. Courts, on the other hand, proceed on an ad hoc basis
with the assistance only of private litigants. Thus, we may expect
faster and better results in Lanham Act cases if the courts embrace
the handiwork of the administrative agencies.
V.

CONCLUSION

When a drug manufacturer claims through advertising that
scientific data establish the superiority of its product over another drug on the market, whether in terms of safety or efficacy,
the message is a powerful and important one. Medications, and
correct information about them, are vital to our well-being.
Scientific establishment claims in comparative drug advertising are subject to complementary systems of regulation. The
FDA and FTC directly regulate these claims on the public's behalf to ensure that they are not false or misleading. Under the
Lanham Act, aggrieved pharmaceutical manufacturers may also
act to interdict false or misleading scientific establishment claims.
Congress created this dual scheme of regulation, governed by
nearly identical standards, to protect the public interest in truthful advertising.
Over the years, the FDA and FTC have carefully considered
the important public policies involved in the regulation of drug
advertising. These agencies have addressed the nature of the scientific evidence essential to sustain scientific establishment
claims in drug advertising and have also articulated regulatory
standards to govern those claims.
In Lanham Act litigation involving scientific establishment
claims, courts should defer to the scientific and policy judgments
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of these agencies. Through coordinated standards, both bodies
of law would gain strength. Moreover, coordinated standards
would enable courts to resolve Lanham Act litigation with
greater efficiency and effectiveness and thus foreclose serious
threats to the public welfare.

